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Abstract. Societies as open social systems work through semiotic modelling systems. 
We view their relevance for shaping primary and secondary needs, as well as metaneeds 
that are conditioned in social systems. Through conditioning in socialization, 
semiotic reality can be naturalized up to a level where we can start speaking about 
not only unconscious, but also unintentional semiosic activity. By that, the very 
realm of indexicality will be questioned. If indexicality is conjoined with unintended 
referentiality, then unintentional semiosis means the blurring and fusion of realities 
far beyond the so-called simulacral semiotic spaces. It is especially acute in the context 
of the development of technological availabilities where the physical, the semiotic, 
and the purely virtual reality merge. That quite novel phenomenon is exemplified by 
semiotic insularization. What follows is that it is hard to define the research object, for 
the subject is fading away, the real and the virtual are intermingling also in terms of 
their inhabitants (biological humans, computer users, avatars, virtual identities). Thus 
the pragmatic dimension of semiotics is gradually becoming lost. Also, the referential 
reality is moving farther from the informational space created and represented in 
“traditional” discursive flows, rather becoming based on pseudoreferential clues of 
meaning making.
Keywords: semiotic theory; secondary modelling systems; needs; social semiotics; 
sociosemiotics; unintentional semiosis; virtual reality; X-reality
This article points out certain important consequences that are relevant for novel 
research perspectives for the web of terms and concepts such as ‘modelling’, ‘sign 
systems’, ‘secondary modelling systems’, etc. At the same time, the goal is not to 
offer a historiographical overview of these terms. I aim to work out a conceptual 
network that constitutes the backbone of the concept of semiotic systems or 
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secondary modelling systems, taking into account two objectives. First, let me try 
to give a view on ‘secondary modelling systems’ that is somewhat broader than 
those usually associated with the Tartu-Moscow School (TMS). Second, I propose 
a possible alteration in the comprehension of ‘secondary modelling systems’ (as 
the meaning of the term is rather vague) as they can be seen in the actual realm 
of interaction. Third, I argue that in contemporary criss-crossing of referential 
realities (ontological, epistemical, computational, virtual), modelling systems and 
the faculties of their functioning (perception, cognition) have become merged.
It has become a commonplace to associate ‘secondary modelling systems’ with 
the TMS. Comprehensive overviews of this have been offered by, for example, 
Peter Grzybek (1994a, 1994b, 1999), or in a narrower case, by M. Lotman (2000). 
The very phrasing of the concept probably comes from the TMS, but the idea of 
diverse levels of modelling is widespread geographically, disciplinarily, and has 
long temporal history and numerous roots. Therefore, I will not focus specifically 
on the meaning of secondary modelling systems in the paradigm of the TMS, nor 
do I question the original trademark of the concept as such. Rather, let me take 
a closer look at how the idea of various orders of semiotization has been applied 
in a few modes of thinking about humans, culture, society and environment. 
Currently, these ways of thinking are usually associated with other disciplines, but 
I consider possibilities of seeing an overlap between these views, and will indicate 
how second-order sign systems or expressions with a similar meaning open up a 
way for a holistic study of humans, culture, environment and society. The topic 
of orders of semiotization obviously has to do with both the horizontal and the 
vertical dimensions. That is, on the horizontal axis, when selecting a modelling 
system for analysis, we are to solve the issue of its borders as having to do with its 
adjacent allies. For example, film is surrounded by theatre, music, literature and 
similar fields. On the other hand, the vertical adjacency of modelling may concern 
the inspection of how gestural sign systems are related with tactile perception, 
proxemics and verbal language. Thus, the vertical juxtaposition of modelling 
systems can concern the possible semiotic hierarchy of sign systems and the 
semiotic threshold. 
One of the first questions when considering modelling is if we want to model 
the whole, so-to-speak suprasystemic object, or just parts of it? This is hardly an 
answerable question. In modelling everything is concerned with everything and 
everything is relative. The latter statement should not be seen as a mere common-
language utterance, but the topic of modelling can, in the end, be reduced to 
building relations in all possible (semiotic and non-semiotic) fields of cognition 
and perception. Instead of hurriedly revising the concept of modelling and 
modelling systems over and over again, especially in the limited and extremely 
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conditional paradigm of cultural semiotics alone, we might make the effort to trace 
back the idea of modelling both historically and paradigmatically. Yet that would 
be an extensive, if not impossible, mission, because modelling and the process of 
modelling have been labelled by a variety of terms, and discussed in every line 
of thought that has touched the issue of human (or other) conglomerations and 
associations. Let us try to consider it possible that the concept of modelling and 
secondary modelling systems in the TMS cultural semiotics did not emerge out of 
the blue but was the result of a logical development of scholarly thought in general, 
on a global scale. There have been extensive discussions on what modelling 
systems might be, and what it is that they bring along on and for the metalevel of 
knowledge. But: what – if any – might have been their background and parallel 
paradigms for cultural semiotics? And if they manifest a theoretical history, what 
would it entail? Would any heuristic consequences for contemporary scholarship 
arise? As mentioned above, the present paper does not actually give proof of 
the sources or roots for the culturo-semiotic account of modelling systems, but 
it brings to the fore certain background circumstances and parallel conceptions, 
particularly as related to contemporary sociocultural communicative situations.
It is difficult to deny that everything that can be classified amongst artefacts 
or conceptual units could be a model of something or a model for something 
(Geertz 1973: 93ff). Since models for something also imply being models of 
something, the modelling of some dimension of the environment performed by 
a semiotic subject also encompasses self-modelling or, as this is more specifically 
termed, autocommunicative identity discourse. By studying modelling, an analysis 
of either some things or models of some things is implied. In general, there is 
not too big a difference stemming from the choice between the object level and 
the metalevel. Parallelism between the object level and the metalevel has been 
suggested by the TMS and its short phrase ‘modelling systems’. There are no 
discrepancies in principle between systems that model something in cultures 
(possibly of diverse types) and models that are made of modelling on the level of 
(scholarly) description. This logic has also been applied throughout (American) 
cultural anthropology under a slogan according to which culture can be taken 
both as an abstraction and as a theory (for example, Geertz 1973; Goodenough 
1970; Kluckhohn 1961; Schneider 1980). 
Culture and metaculture, cultural codes and descriptive metalanguages, 
semiotic systems and semiotic metasystems are interrelated and bound. Culture 
as an object of study which is composed of cultural units of various scales can be 
analysed by several methods and angles like art, religion, science. That level of 
analysis must be seen as that of metaculture(s) in relation to culture as its object. 
Amongst other notable inferences that follow from here it is important that 
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cultures and metacultures may be viewed as conditional and basically dependent 
on purely evaluative circumstances, being potentially subject to change in their 
very status. In short, according to this concept of modelling systems, the object 
level and the metalevel are interrelated and interdependent, and the status and 
descriptive value of science, art, or religion is contextual, being at least time-
dependent. For example, much of what was considered scientific during the 
Middle Ages is seen as a matter of religion or faith today, and like many artistic 
trends (symbolism, cubism, Dadaism, etc.) have aimed at disclosing the actual 
reality behind the screen of appearances, so will contemporary scholarship be 
retrospectively re-evaluated in the future.
The agency of systems
Linking modelling with systems, be it systems with things or systems of things, 
attention should be paid to how modelling systems have been studied under 
different names in diverse lines of thought. By doing so, we must keep in mind that 
we are not actually dealing with dissimilar ‘disciplines’ or with labels of individual 
disciplines, but with ways of thinking. For example, besides ‘modelling systems’ and 
their contents, it should not be too much to ask what such notions as social units, 
cultural units, cognitive units, semiotic units, their other alternatives and larger 
conglomerations (e.g. the Mind, the Self) stand for. Also, some key characteristics 
of modelling systems must not be forgotten. For example, a frequent claim is that 
modelling systems function. Functioning may involve (e.g., in the case of texts 
and cultures) generation, storage and transmission of information (e.g., Lotman 
1990: 11–19). These are notions and labels that can, with evident effortlessness, 
be replaced with terms of quite free choice. Besides, functioning, even if in an 
implicit – or default! – manner, discloses the nature of cultural semiotics not as a 
structuralist paradigm, but as a paradigm capable, at least in principle, of involving 
also the study of agency and processes. ‘Functioning’ is a notion which leads 
directly to a first parallel with the ‘modelling systems’ of the TMS. ‘Parallel’ here 
serves as an extremely mild term for an actually both historically and conceptually 
preceding line of thought for cultural semiotics. Of course, I hereby keep in mind 
systems theory, which at the same time actually is a mild option, for it can even be 
regarded as a vast parallel universe for semiotics in general.
The origins of systems theory can, at least in the present context, be associated 
with two names: Arthur Koestler (1967) and Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1968). 
Koestler’s ideas of the holon (1967: 45–58, esp. 48) and of systems as non-summative 
wholes constitute not merely a predecessor of Lotman’s poetic re-phrasing of 
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the impossibility of building up a calf out of veal-cutlets (Lotman 1984: 7). Their 
common share is much larger, because both ‘holons’ and ‘systems’ are inevitably 
and immanently concerned with modelling. At first glance, we can, by and large, 
compare systems theory to semiotics. But is it adequate to regard systems theory 
as a universe parallel to cultural semiotics? Or, rather, does cultural semiotics 
correspond to a re-phrasing paradigm for its historical predecessor? Can we 
actually draw a separating boundary between the ‘systems’ of (general) systems 
theory and the ‘modelling systems’ of cultural semiotics? In short, I consider this 
to be a misplaced boundary. As I explain in more detail below, the functionality of 
systems in these two paradigms is measurable by quite dissimilar mechanisms. In 
cultural semiotics, a ‘modelling system’ is:
[...] a structure of elements and rules for their compilation that are in the state of 
fi xed analogy all over the fi eld of the object cognised, brought to consciousness, 
or arrangement. Th erefore, the modelling system may be viewed as language. 
(Lotman 1967: 130)
On the other hand, the essence of modelling systems has to be understood 
in the light of their main feature, namely functioning. Here we can see a quite 
characteristic fog of controversy in the metalanguage of the TMS, for Lotman’s 
‘analogical language’, be it natural/primary or secondary, built on natural language, 
ought to be a means of communication and arrangement of information in a 
modelling system. The definition of natural language has been symptomatically 
avoided by members of the TMS. Yet sometimes its communicative function 
seems to have been presumed, for the language of a socium:
[…] on the one hand unites the given socium, making possible communication 
between its representatives, unifi ed reactions to ongoing events. On the other 
hand, it organises the very information, forming the basis of selection of facts 
and establishing a specifi c connection between them: those not described in that 
“language” are as if not perceived by the social addressee, they simply fall out of its 
fi eld of vision. (Uspenskij 1974: 119)
From here it stems that the TMS’s notion of ‘language’ refers both to natural 
language, as belonging to primary modelling systems, and to cultural language, 
as a phenomenon of secondary modelling. Language can be a means of commu-
nication, but simultaneously, it is used to manipulate the sensory perception of the 
individual as a biological organism. It can be a tool in the paradigm of a modelling 
system, it can be a modelling system on its own and it can also be both a primary 
and a secondary modelling system. Likewise, the TMS’s language can be both 
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individual and social. As it does not change the game (it is not worthwhile here 
searching for other (vague) trials of defining ‘language’ by the TMS scholars), we 
can consider that in the TMS’s paradigm the three meanings of language (langage, 
langue, parole) are in use, but they also change places and blur into each other. 
This fusion of ‘language’ as taken sometimes as a modelling system, sometimes 
as a tool of a modelling system, and sometimes as something else (for example, 
a cultural code, set of generative regulations or grammar, etc.), should not be 
preferred in scholarly discourse. However, I argue that, currently, the sociocultural 
environment and the essence of humanity has changed radically from the times 
of the TMS’s classic period, and the metalinguistic confusion mentioned actually 
already meets a similar confusion on the object level.
What are, then, ‘systems’ for systems theory? We ought to search for a logically 
comparable argument from areas dealing openly not with merely open systems as 
such, but with those open systems that lead to the societal and cultural spheres. One 
of the first scholars associated with using general systems theory to describe societies 
was Walter F. Buckley. Buckley, discussing ‘complex adaptive systems’ argued that:
[…] our adaptive system – whether biological, psychological, or sociocultural – 
must manifest 1) some degree of “plasticity” and “sensitivity” or tension vis-à-vis 
its environment such that it carries on a constant interchange with environmental 
events, acting and reacting to them; 2) some source of mechanism providing 
for variety, to act as a potential pool of adaptive variability to meet the problem 
of mapping new or more detailed variety and constraints in a changeable 
environment; 3) a set of selective criteria or mechanisms against which the “variety 
pool” may be sift ed into those variations in the organization or system that more 
closely map the environment and those that do not; and 4) an arrangement for 
preserving and/or propagating these “successful” mappings. (Buckley 1967: 63)
Buckley, as Bertalanffy before him, apparently did not – at least not in the first 
order of priority – distinguish between ‘social systems’, ‘open biological systems’, 
‘open social systems’, ‘complex adaptive systems’ or similar concepts. What 
matters for the present argument is that all of these designate systems that model 
something. Comparably, in Juri Lotman’s culturosemiotic view, modelling activity 
as such lies in:
[…] man’s activity in creating models. In order for results of this activity to 
be received as analogues of an object, they must be subject to certain (either 
intuitively or consciously set) rules of analogy, and therefore relate to one or 
another modelling system. (Lotman 1967: 130)
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Although not of primary importance, Lotman’s more specific object field of study 
(literary and cultural texts) is what facilitated the inclusion of the human factor 
into modelling activity. In parallel, Buckley’s understanding of the operating of 
complex adaptive systems does not, at least at first glance, imply the existence 
of intentional consciousness. However, both arguments are concerned with the 
transformation of a certain ‘objective reality’ into a subjective version of it. Either 
a system, a modelling system, a social system, or any other kind of (open) system 
is a holon, separable from its environment(s). This implies interaction, or at least 
activity, between systems and environment(s), and, in the case of higher open 
systems, that systems as holons are provided with a central nervous system (cf. 
Searle 2000). Such interaction entails modelling activity that is at least available 
to consciousness, and is performed with some kind of intentionality or at least 
according to certain habits of inference, and has been oftentimes ascribed solely 
to the species of Homo sapiens (e.g. Cherry 1975: 269–282). 
There is another relevant consideration for drawing evident parallels between 
culturosemiotic ‘modelling systems’ and ‘systems’ in the systems theory. Buckley’s 
discourse is focused on open social systems or complex adaptive systems.This 
means that through the category of (free choice in) adaptation, the moment 
of intentionality is involved just as the human component is switched into the 
definition of modelling activity by J. Lotman. Social systems are open systems 
that adapt to the environment. This adaptation has several important nuances: (a) 
adaptation to the physical surroundings; (b) semiotization of the surroundings 
or transformation of the physical environment into significant environment; (c) 
adaptation to the significant environment. Thus adaptation goes for the modelling 
of both physical as well as semiotic reality.
The theoretical development of the systems theory towards being applied to 
social systems meant a simultaneous development of this paradigm of thought 
from the study of closed systems towards open systems, open social systems 
in particular. Two crucial side-effects of that progress are the movements in 
theorizing from closed systems adapting to their physiochemical environment 
to open social systems and the consideration of the sociocultural dimension. 
The enlarging surroundings of social systems meant the multiplication of the 
environment: the physical or physiochemical environment is accompanied 
by social, cultural, political, economic, linguistic ones, and so forth. The issue 
does not concern the choice between environments or unidirectional movement 
between diverse dimensions of the environment, but the multiplication and 
intermingling of the above-mentioned environmental perspectives. Closed systems 
(e.g. mechanical, physiochemical) operate through energy flows characterized by 
physical (mechanical, chemical) causality, i.e., they run on such environmental 
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causality where ‘environmental’ may be understood in common language. Open 
social systems function to a considerable extent on informational or semiotic 
causality (cf. Nauta’s survey of information processes, Nauta 1972: 34). The 
movement from environmental to informational-semiotic causality means transfer 
from signal semiosis to symbol semiosis, whereby between closed systems and 
open social systems there is room for such open systems that operate with such 
energetic units. Importantly, the nature of those energetic units rather depends on 
the metainterpreter. Such systems are in principle separated from those available 
to human researchers by the qualities of potential signs used: 
An important diff erence between signal and symbol semiosis […] is that in signal 
semiosis the meaning aspects, and the related functional aspects (which are made 
explicit in semantics and pragmatics) are not related to the standard interpreter 
(as is the case with human language) but only to the scientifi c descriptor of the 
process, i.e. the meta-interpreter. (Nauta 1972: 42)
Action based on physical-environmental causality and signal semiosis supposes 
observable stimuli and responses. Such signals are perceptible forms of energy. 
Informational-semiotic causality brings along covert behaviour: carriers of 
informational energy are meaning carriers. At this point ‘meaning carriers’ are to 
be rendered in the info-semiotic context (e.g. Morris, Nauta), and not yet merged 
with the Uexküllian paradigm. Yet in the case of open social systems, the perceptual 
and the conceptual are equal in the sense of always being filtered through the 
mind. Thus energy and information obtain a semiotically very similar, if not equal 
status. Apparently, this was a favourable departure point for what has been called 
cybersemiotics or infosemiotics, in the purpose of analysing information processors 
as black boxes which receive stimuli and produce outputs (or effect). Differences 
between the original context of systems theory and more semiotically biased 
approaches emerge precisely in light of the latter’s understanding of information as 
a form of energy forged into the shape of meaning carriers. Curiously, discrepancies 
between the original systems theory (Ludwig von Bertalanffy in the first place) 
and its later siblings (branching also into semiotics) bring along interesting 
problems as well as solutions to the interpretation of data processors as ‘black 
boxes’. Compared with mechanical circuits or cybersemiotic feedback loops, that 
black box is fundamentally of a different character, depending on where we place 
it on the axis ‘closed system – open social system’. It certainly is, and in reality has 
been, very tempting to treat all ecomapping units in a similar manner, and to view 
them as modelling systems. Amongst other things, such a universally oriented 
comprehension was exactly what led to (what can be termed) radical behaviourism. 
By this term I refer to approaches grounded in the understanding that transactions 
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between a holon and its environment follow the scheme ‘input – black box – output’. 
By observing the output, or differences between the input and the output, inferences 
can be drawn about what is semiotically and psychically happening in a given “black 
box”. These behaviourist approaches fall short in discriminating between signal 
semiosis and symbol semiosis, trends allowing meta-interpretation to translate 
interpretation of the object level on the terms of a meta-interpreter.
Between the more or less parallel universes of semiotics and systems theory we 
meet a fatal combination where they touch in the middle, simultaneously with their 
gradual parting in research principles: systems theory has mostly been centred on 
the output (or on comparing output with stimuli) of interpretative systems, while 
semiotics has rather been concerned with the inside of the “black box”. This is the 
point of departure for semiotics and the original systems theory: for semiotics, the 
sphere of the actual research target lies inside the interpreting system (be it termed 
Mind, interpreter, person, individual, etc.). This difference between what Jerzy Pelc 
(1992: 26) called ‘entities interpretable as signs’ and signs proper is compatible with 
the understanding of overt and covert behaviour as not overlapping. Ignoring this 
difference was one of the seeds of radical behaviourism. Attention should be paid 
to the point that the varied terminology referring to these two completely different 
realms (signs and non-signs, semiotic and physical reality, signs and signals, 
etc.) does not cause confusion. It does not bring along any changes to the issue 
at hand. Comprehension of this principle boundary coincides with the boundary 
between the object-level and the metalevel and helps to demarcate the research 
domain of semiotics. This coincidence of the boundary between physiochemical 
and semiotic realities, on the one hand, and the object-level and the metalevel, on 
the other hand, has been well articulated by Doede Nauta. It should be mentioned, 
though, that Nauta’s observation is concerned with drawing attention to the need of 
acknowledging differences between overt and covert behaviour, and signs and non-
signs. Nauta’s scheme of semiosis is a five-fold relation: S(s, i, e, d, c), where S stands 
for the semiotic relation (in our case, for semiosis); s for sign; i for interpreter; e for 
effect (e also being the interpretant or the disposition in i to react in a certain way 
to d under certain conditions); d for denotatum and c for context. He commented:
If one treats i as a black box (an open system, whose inner structure is not 
specifi ed) and s as its input, one has to be careful not to treat e as the output of i. 
As a matter of fact e is a change in the inner state of the black box, involving an 
alteration of the pattern of future outputs of i. (Nauta 1972: 28)
Nauta’s formulation, as he admits, is actually an elaboration of Charles Morris’ 
treatment of the interpretant as a realization of a psychical state:
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A ‘psychical state,’ or even a response, is not as such an interpretant but becomes 
such only in so far as it is a ‘taking-account-of-something’ evoked by a sign vehicle. 
(Morris 1938: 45)
Therefore, semiosis can happen through complex intertwined cognitive practises 
that, as we shall soon see, are proposed as present already in John Dewey’s (1896) 
similar but much earlier definition of sign-processes. Regardless, if sign-processes, 
on this account, involve consciousness, they always are intentional. Inasmuch as 
semiosis is a cognitive phenomenon, the behaviourism associated with Morris 
concerns covert behaviour and cannot be reduced to recordable actions in the 
physical environment. On the other hand, Morris refers to sign-vehicles as 
functional by certain semantical rules (Morris 1938: 45). Reaching interpretants 
and conditionally concluding the cycle of semiosis is thus dependent on the 
recognition and application of (also conditionally) crystallized relations between 
sign-vehicles and things that are being “taken account of ”.
This understanding of components in the communication chain is purely 
semiotic and corresponds to transfer from closed systems to open social systems 
as the latter are based on informational or semiotic causality rather than purely 
physiochemical causality. Furthermore, this transfer can also be characterized as 
development from information carriers to meaning carriers and further to sign-
vehicles and signs. In other words, the concepts of significant environment and 
modelling join together not only semiotics and systems theory, but, curiously, 
also the semiological and semiotic paradigms. It is not that important how signs 
are defined in their minute details or what terms are used to label the sign’s 
ingredients. The most important aspect as concerns the present discussion is 
that signs as semiotic units are conceptual entities. Signs beget their contents in 
people’s minds on a purely psychological level as per Saussure’s terminology that 
will be examined below. The psychological level is the starting and re-starting 
point for speech circuit. From there, signs travel through the physiological to the 
physical level, and, via the physiological, back to the psychological level. 
The topic apparently has to do with that of semiotic threshold and principally 
different realms of reference. The issue of primary and secondary sign systems 
as having to do with different levels of feedback loops is central in regard to 
behaviouristic views concerned with explaining both overt and covert behaviour 
as having to do with either concrete or abstract reference, or both. Feedback loops 
function in diverse (above-mentioned) environmental dimensions, and are linked 
with the semiotic threshold as connected also with different types of needs of 
organisms. On the one hand, this makes the subject more complex. On the other 
hand, needs as such enable us to centre at open social and open systems rather 
than closed systems as, for example, inorganic ones. 
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Socioculturally rational conduct in terms of both overt and covert behaviour 
that takes place in diverse dimensions of the environment through both primary 
and secondary sign systems, is obviously based on the value system given. This 
understanding is directly connected with Bronislaw Malinowski’s treatment of 
basic and derived needs (Malinowski 1944: 85–131) that can equally generally be 
labelled as primary and secondary needs (Abraham Maslow’s theory is useful in this 
regard as well, as I will argue below). There can be no dealing of the latter without 
the former, but primary needs can eventually be socioculturally manipulated 
by needs and values that have to do with the secondary level. Additionally, the 
satisfaction of needs critically depends on understanding (equals ‘modelling’ here) 
diverse kinds of environments. Primary needs, though, can be satisfied via the 
agenda or means associated with secondary needs; this statement should probably 
be confined to open social systems in particular. At this point it is relevant to 
think back to Ivan Pavlov and his work that was not aimed only at explaining 
overt physiological behaviour in terms of unconditioned and conditioned reflexes. 
Eventually, Pavlov also paid attention to how the satisfaction of diverse types 
of needs is connected (1) with first- and second-order sign systems, (2) with 
primary and secondary signs systems, and (3) also with relations between overt 
and covert behaviour as pertaining to different levels of the informational realm.
First and second order signs and systems
In case of primary and secondary modelling systems, it is necessary to remember 
an important nuance that concerns the historical and conceptual background of 
these notions. Since these concepts entered wide circulation (which was probably 
connected with the publication of Theses of Cultural Semiotics at the beginning of 
the 1970s), they have and are being treated as the TMS’s original terms as if rooted 
in a specific geographically and disciplinarily delimited environment. Nevertheless, 
they have a background and historical content that had been described before, and 
had been developing long enough (by the time cultural semioticians started to use 
them) in order to achieve a considerable level of interdisciplinarity, maybe even 
of transdisciplinarity.
It is inconceivable that cultural semioticians of the TMS were unaware of studies 
in fields like psychology, psychiatry, linguistics, anthropology, and other areas that 
were carried out in the Russian-language space of scholarship ever since the end 
of the 19th century. By the middle of the 20th century, in many departments of 
Soviet scholarship, notions such as ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ had been used to 
denote levels of modelling for several decades already. Those departments must 
not be taken as separate fully developed disciplines, because during those times 
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sociocultural phenomena were rather addressed using complex analysis, or at least 
from a much wider perspective than that in contemporary specialized narrow 
disciplines. That was a transdisciplinary paradigm for which Homo sapiens was 
a complex and holistic subject, active in its diverse environments. Accordingly, 
primary and secondary phenomena and levels of cognition-perception were 
addressed in regard to neurological, psychological, linguistic and even essentially 
semiotic processes. Predecessors of culturosemiotic primary and secondary 
modelling systems are clearly seen in Pavlov’s works which, as mentioned above, 
could not have been unknown to scholars of the TMS during the second half of 
the 20th century.
Principally, Pavlov’s entire work was centred on relations between conditioned 
and unconditioned reflexes, or, in other words, on relations between primary and 
secondary levels. Primary and secondary systems clearly form the red thread in 
Pavlov’s whole work. It is thus important to maintain an awareness that his main 
drive for research was not merely a supposed obsession with experiments with 
dogs. His aims were much more ambitious and relevant, probably since the very 
beginning of his research:
Essentially only one thing in life interests us: our psychical constitution, the 
mechanism of which was and is wrapped in darkness. All human resources, art, 
religion, literature, philosophy and historical sciences, all of them join in bringing 
light in this darkness. But man has still another powerful resource: natural science 
with its strictly objective methods. Th is science, as we all know, is making huge 
progress every day. Th e facts and considerations which I have placed before you 
at the end of my lecture are one out of numerous attempts to employ a consistent, 
purely scientifi c method of thinking in the study of the mechanism of the highest 
manifestations of life in the dog, the representative of the animal kingdom that is 
man’s best friend. (Pavlov 1904)1
Referring to conditioned and unconditioned reflexes, he usually called them 
primary and secondary sign systems only implicitly or in a roundabout manner, 
but there still are some concrete notions. For example, he mentioned primary and 
secondary signal systems (e.g. in Pavlov 1967: 162–165). Mutual relations between 
Pavlov’s and the Pavlovian discourse, on the one hand, and cultural semiotics, on 
the other hand, deserve longer individual treatment. The association of Pavlov 
with strictly zoological-neurological studies is extremely superficial. His research 
having been based on animal tests does not alter the fact that one of Pavlov’s 
1 Pavlov, Ivan Petrovitch 1904. Nobel lecture: Physiology of digestion. Nobelprize.org. 
Nobel Media AB 2014. Retrieved from http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/medicine/
laureates/1904/pavlov-lecture.html on 20 Dec. 2017.
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goals was the description of relationships between the biological being and the 
environment in general and in principle. What could be the functioning of the 
higher nervous system of humans, how can results of experimental non-human 
animal tests be applied (but not extrapolated!) to the study of human animals? 
Such questions arise often in Pavlov’s work, leading to discussions about sign 
systems characteristic of Homo sapiens only. We might recall an excerpt from 
Pavlov’s argument that in a curious and significant manner links with Thomas A. 
Sebeok’s (1988) similar thoughts on the grading of modelling systems:
Th ere arises in the developing human an extraordinary perfection, the signals of 
the second order, the signals of the primary signals in the form of words – the 
spoken, the heard, the seen word. (Pavlov 1967: 162)
The Pavlovian discourse is in principle important for culturo-semiotic concep-
tions, for it involves the topic of reflex behaviour including, for example, cultural 
automatisms, creativity, emergence and usage of stereotypes and the similar. In 
principle, there is a need to replenish the scientific and historical contents of 
primary and secondary modelling systems. For example, issues relating to the 
so-called primary and secondary needs, or animalistic and cultural needs, seem 
to have switched to being concerns rather belonging to the area of research of 
(cultural) anthropologists. Thus, this topic, which was dealt with by Malinowski, 
reinforces the link between the Pavlovian discourse and cultural semiotics. 
Malinowski acknowledged and referred to Pavlov’s relevant works (e.g. Malinowski 
1944: 133). Beyond cultural semiotics, it is clear that, once more, we face a line 
of thought leading to relations and the Mind. That is, when trying to describe 
relations between the semiotization of the world and (spatial-environmental) 
behaviour, these aspects and processes cannot be understood in a behaviourist 
interpretation of overt behaviour, but in the semiotic developments and changes 
that take place in the psychological faculties. It is exactly the semiotic behaviour 
and semiotization of the world for which the works on primarity and secondarity 
of, among others, Pavlov and Malinowski, form an important background that 
enables grasping the behavioural irrationality of individuals and societies or rather, 
comprehending the relativity and context-dependence of rationality up to the level 
of problems in intercultural communication. 
The distinction between primary and secondary sign systems is much wider, 
older and more transdisciplinary than suggested by the Tartu-Moscow cultural 
semioticians. However, this does not mean that cultural semiotics would obtain 
the status of so-to-speak niche semiotics. Rather, even when adding a perspective 
on modelling systems of more than two levels, as done in Sebeok 1988, ideas on 
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the essence and levels of modelling connect perspectives in humanities and social 
sciences, while also disclosing ties between semiotic and semiological trends in 
the study of signs and sign systems. Clearly, these connections concern also such 
logic and levels of modelling that have been articulated in the concepts of umwelt, 
linguistic reality and semiotic reality. These three levels unite and possibly cohere 
semiotic activities on the biological, individual and sociocultural scales, having 
sometimes found synchronic treatment through concepts such as, for example, 
Lebenswelt, social reality, society, mundane reason, logical universe of discourse, 
semiosphere and others.
Although starting off from the sphere of physiological studies and the animal 
kingdom, Pavlov’s efforts seem rather to have been aimed at vivisecting the 
human’s Mind in its mental processes and functioning from the beginning. This 
can be confirmed on the basis of his lectures (Pavlov 1941), and was poetically 
articulated for the first time in Pavlov’s Nobel lecture:
It is not accidental that all phenomena of human life are dominated by the 
search for daily bread – the oldest link connecting all living things, man 
included, with the surrounding nature. (Pavlov 1904)
It would be enlightening to allow ‘daily bread’ to be interpreted in a wider perspec-
tive, maybe even to replace it with the notion of energy from systems theorizing. 
That provides a clear view of Pavlov’s aspirations. From the viewpoint of the 
humanities or the social sciences, ‘energy’ may be associated with natural sciences 
or faculties distant from the social and cultural activity of humans. Yet that is 
definitely not the case, since ‘energy’ can be quite explanatory for describing the 
transformation of power into diverse types and shapes of in-formation. Energy 
does not consist in the kinetic dimension alone. Rather, it can have several. We 
agree with Richard Adams in that there is “no problem in conceiving of coal or 
petroleum as energy forms” (Adams 1988: 15). However, especially in a semiotic 
context, this article also agrees with his claim:
[…] we also regard human beings, human behavior, social groups, and assemblages 
of social interaction as energy forms. Similarly, mental processes located in the 
brain, writing on paper, and soundwaves in the air are also energy forms. […] 
Each has potential or kinetic energy. (Adams 1988: 15–16)
In this light, it is perhaps important to acknowledge that physical or chemical 
energy can be transformed into texts (written, behaved, pictured) that contain and 
produce information. That is, energy is altered into forms that are in-formative 
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in three senses: these forms both (1) contain and (2) produce information and, 
(3) as information bearers, they transmit information, obtaining again the status 
of energy that can be used for the production and maintenance of information. 
Therefore, primary and secondary sign systems are involved in and form infor-
mational circulation systems in terms of the transformative stages of energy. To 
put it bluntly: whenever primary sign systems, such as natural languages, are 
transformed into, for example, written texts, the latter prepare ground for the 
production of new information in natural languages on the level of primary sign 
systems. Not even too humorously, after such artefacts as texts on paper or on 
other material have been recycled, they obtain the form of energetic material that 
can, after physical and physiological consumption, be used for the production of 
yet another cycle of information generation on the level of physical and chemical 
energy as basis for (novel) sign systems. Hence, why not add such a perspective 
and its emotional aspect to the theme of book burning (since medieval times 
up to today) and demolition of artefacts or the Parsonian ‘cultural objects’ (e.g. 
destruction of ancient cities by the extremist group ISIS)?
This culturosemiotic view can be significantly more comprehensive on the 
level of sign systems as sign systems by extending it with a Pavlovian perspec-
tive. This will be aided by considering an even simplified understanding of 
conditioned reflexes. Physiological reflexes are reactions to forms of energy on 
the primary level as the potentiality of in-formation on the secondary level. On 
the primary level, food for a dog is a form of energy for the production of potential 
expectations associated with certain characteristics (smell, material, visual form) 
that may start influencing the dog’s future behaviour both on the conscious and 
unconscious levels of intentionality. After having successfully been established as 
stimuli for conditioned reflexes, food’s accompanying signals turn into secondary 
signs that work as representations of stimuli on the level of primary sign systems. 
This logic seems to be of utmost importance for Homo sapiens as well, especially 
when connecting conscious and unconscious, intentional and unintentional, 
individual and sociocultural behaviour, behavioural individualities and behaviou-
ral automatisms. In this line, Pavlov’s explanation of (human) behaviour is 
related with communal behaviour in general, especially when keeping in mind 
totalitarian societies as such, and regarding not only administrative-political 
regimes, but also others (religious, cultural) that have to do with their impact 
on public informational space. This, however, remains outside the scope of the 
present article.
Thus, there are numerous links between the specifically culturosemiotic 
view on sign systems and Pavlov’s conceptions. Besides aspects concerning the 
(elementary) levels of sign production, there also exist significant ties between 
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his ideas of the primary and secondary sign systems as having to do with the 
developmental levels of sign production as treated both in semiotics and psycho-
logy. In semiotics, or more exactly in semiology, it is common knowledge that sign 
processes are completed on three levels: the psychological, the physiological, and 
the physical (Saussure 1959: 9). 
On the other hand, semiosis concerns the resolution of the semiotic potentia-
lity on the levels of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, as maintained by 
Peirce. This is a very interesting interplay of forms of energy and information on 
diverse levels. From the viewpoint of systems theory and informational semiotics 
(and cybernetics) decisive feedback loops are created on and in between these 
dissimilar semiosic levels. From the viewpoint that leads further and farther into 
the sphere of psychology, the strong semiotic basement of various treatments of 
human psychological development across numerous psychic levels is inferred. 
We can recall the roots of describing the shaping of the human social mind and 
psychological development in the original logic of Pierre Janet that was and has 
been developed by several scholars, most notably Jean Piaget. 
Thirdly, or in parallel, if we would choose a manner of describing the de-
velop ment of the TMS from the original working notion and research object of 
text towards the notions of primary and secondary modelling systems, Piaget’s 
description of movement from primitive concepts towards scientific concepts and 
explanations becomes particularly useful. Janet’s and Piaget’s (and their followers’) 
understanding that such development can occur in a pre-established semiotic and 
social (and scientific) environment is remarkable. Yet while taking into account 
the very complex background of the TMS’s primary and secondary modelling 
systems as linked with ideas of Pavlov and Malinowski, and binding that set with 
ideas about the ontological development of psychological skills, it is important to 
presume the intermingled essence of cognitive and sensory processes, semiotic 
and psychological departments of the Mind. Adding to these complex topics 
entailed in Sebeok’s proposition of seeing levels of modelling in at least a threefold 
hierarchy, we probably should not rule out that all these issues are not only 
intermingled, but also mixed and even messed up, especially in the contemporary 
stage of the civiliographic development.
Refl ex – gesture – mindful behaviour
Semiotics, semiology, psychology, the main principles of systems theory and 
their intersections have all touched upon the issue of primary and secondary 
sign systems and the relevant stages or layers of semiotic development of open 
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systems and open social systems. Charles Morris could be regarded as an 
insightful addition to the treatment of hierarchical sign systems, even though 
his works have not been considered in this regard. He is a key figure for the 
institutionalization and legitimization of contemporary semiotics, as well as 
a facilitator of fundamental ideas of modern (developmental) psychology. He 
connected the semiotic and the psychological lines of thought (it was him who 
mediated George Herbert Mead to wider public), like the Eastern and Western 
paradigms of culturological and psychological ideas. 
Describing most general working principles and areas of diverse types of 
signs, Morris discussed primary and secondary uses of signs and connected the 
topic with that of intentionality. Morris disclosed the nature of signs (specifically 
designators) in terms of their usage: “[…] over and above their primary and 
secondary uses they may have a number of individual and social effects or 
consequences which they are not intended to attain” (Morris 1946: 94). He 
introduced an illustration of systems – at the point of artifacts such as mechanical 
engines. Morris (1946: 94) tells us:
Each type of engine has, further, certain functions which it is normally used to 
perform, and these are its primary uses. One type of engine may however under 
certain circumstances be used to perform the task for which another type of 
engine is normally employed, and this would be among its secondary uses. Other 
secondary uses would be to increase the income of the owner of the machine or to 
serve in an exhibit of various mechanical appliances. 
Obviously the example can be extrapolated to other fields, including semiotic units 
as well. Morris (1946: 94) realized this:
Th e case of signs is parallel: kinds of signs may be distinguished in terms of what 
they signify, their primary and secondary uses considered, and the eff ects of their 
existence upon the users of signs and the cultural complex in which they operate 
studied. 
At least the following very important associations or consequences are to be 
observed hereby. First, in connection with intentionality, we really are to re-
member that primary and secondary uses of signs may be based on unintended 
beha viour. That is, communicative agents may not be aware, or may not be quite 
totally aware of the semiotic level or paradigm of meaning they are acting at. In 
the simplest words, communicators may not even be conscious of whether they 
use the denotative or the connotative level of the meaning of signs. In addition 
to the latter, other possible facets of signs may be involved when thinking of the 
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numerous diverse types of signs Morris himself distinguished (Morris 1946: 
72–91). Both aspects are multiplied when we associate primary and secondary 
uses of signs with the Pavlovian discourse and the more or less unconscious level 
of behaving in terms of Pavlov’s first order of signs as having to do with bio-
physiological level, and his second order of signs that may involve also the factor 
of conscious behaviour.
 The second inference comes from the first, and tells us that differentiation 
between primary and secondary uses of signs may not be that easy, for the 
“effects” resulting from semiotic behaviour should not necessarily be regarded 
as immediate or discernible in overt behaviour. This conclusion is in obvious 
accord with Peirce’s concept of the interpretant (CP 2.228) as having to do with 
influence on the semiotic behaviour of people. The effect influences the generation 
of interpretants, and thus may concern merely covert, or additionally also overt 
behaviour. This has been noticed also in informational semiotics (e.g. Nauta 1972), 
and has important consequences for thinking of systems, especially open systems, 
as dynamic transformers of energy and information.
 Third, when seeing cultural semiotics in the light of a historical ideative 
combination of systems theory, Pavlovian discourse, semiotics as transported to 
modernity largely by Morris, and maybe other ideas and thinkers, there appears 
an interesting nuance that goes beyond mere disjunction of cultural semiotics 
and rigid structuralism (structuralism as still a frequent association with cultural 
semiotics). Let me connect Morris’s very lucid opinion on secondary uses of signs 
with a more general view on semiotic systems from the perspective of systems 
theory. This logic leads to viewing parts of a system as functional units that have 
been (and/or are) designed to contribute to achieving certain common or general 
goals. In terms of both systems theory and semiotics (including semiology), as 
well as eventually also of psychology (e.g. levels of development) this means 
movement towards conventionality or the arbitrary essence of parts of a system, 
as also of relations between both parts and the system and parts themselves. Parts 
of a system become replaceable with each other and possibly by imported units 
in the perspective of a specific function of the general system. This brings along 
a justified comparative quest in connection with relations between semiotics and 
systems theory: maybe Lotman’s veal-cutlets can be integrated and reanimated as 
a calf after all?
The issue of first- and second-order use of signs as connected with inten-
tionality concerns virtually all treatments of modelling and levels of modelling 
mentioned: where the lower limit of sign-processes is, and how we could detect 
it on the basis of overt behaviour, beginning from, for example, natural language. 
The interpretation and understanding of the semiotic threshold determines the 
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logical contents of signal processes and symbol processes and the relevant semiotic 
units. Therein lay also answers to relations and differences that concern inter-
species specific communication and the nature of feedback-loops in different 
types of systems. And, of course, those answers also open opportunities for 
relevant semiotic studies that could overcome (conditional) boundaries between 
‘anthroposemiotics’ (Wuketits 1997) and other fields of semiotics. Morris, in 
connection with Pavlov’s idea of language as “a whole system of symbols for the 
more direct signals or conditioned reflexes”, takes a different – at least at first 
glance – stand: 
[…] since on our usage not all conditioned refl exes involve signals, Pavlov’s view 
does not necessarily support the position that all language signs are symbols in the 
sense in which we have defi ned the term. (Morris 1946: 253–254)
Here the modifier ‘necessarily’ seems to deserve attention for more than just 
one reason. First of all, language signs do possess a physical form – either visual 
or vocal. Even on the purely psychological level of language signs where the 
combination of concepts and sound-images takes place, the latter have been 
embedded in the mind as a result of internalization of some external stimulus or 
stimuli. Relations between signals and symbols, conditioned reflexes and language 
signs concern results of resolving the semiotic potential in different energy forms. 
At this point it would be easy to sway into discussing terminological matters, 
relations between signs, signals, symbols, sign-vehicles and the like. These issues 
are of course important, but not essential at the moment. What is more important 
is the nature of the semiotic threshold, relations between energy and information, 
the essence of diverse forms of energy and information, relations between the 
physical and the internalized reality. Combining these issues and the intertwined 
paradigms of both the topics discussed and authors already mentioned, Mead’s 
conception of gestures becomes relevant here:
Th e gesture is that phase of the individual act to which adjustment takes place on 
the part of other individuals in the social process of behavior. Th e vocal gesture 
becomes a signifi cant symbol (unimportant, as such, on the merely aff ective side 
of experience) when it has the same eff ect on the individual making it that it has 
on the individual to whom it is addressed or who explicitly responds to it, and thus 
involves a reference to the self of the individual making it. Th e gesture in general, 
and the vocal gesture in particular, indicates some object or other within the fi eld 
of social behavior, an object of common interest to all the individuals involved 
in the given social act thus directed toward or upon that object. (Mead 1937: 46)
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In the case individuals reach the level of successful trade of gestures, gestures 
become a language. Thereby, gestures are seen as somewhat elementary units in 
the communicative act, being – importantly – of (potentially) abstract nature. 
Gestures are separable elements in the social act and exist as such not only for 
a single individual, but are meaningfully valid in a certain communal setting. 
Also, gestures are subject to the process of learning, since their usage is repeatable 
and repeated, and again – in the social context. The gesture is social, activated in 
a communicative act, and by virtue of being repeatable, can simultaneously be 
drawn out of every singular interactional performance as an individual entity with 
(an abstract) meaning:
What, as it were, takes the gesture out of the social act and isolates it as such – 
what makes it something more than just an early phase of an individual act – is 
the response of another organism, or of other organisms, to it. Such a response is 
its meaning, or gives it its meaning. Th e social situation and process of behavior 
are here presupposed by the acts of the individual organisms implicated therein. 
Th e gesture arises as a separable element in the social act, by virtue of the fact 
that it is selected out by the sensitivities of other organisms to it; it does not exist 
as a gesture merely in the experience of the single individual. Th e meaning of a 
gesture by one organism, to repeat, is found in the response of another organism 
to what would be the completion of the act of the fi rst organism which that gesture 
initiates and indicates. (Mead 1937[1934]: 145–146)
Thus, gestures can also be seen as a transitory phase in the semiotic evolutionary 
range from mechanical-chemical energy to information of purely semiotic essence. 
It is important that the semiotic core of gestures depends on the social context – 
this leads logically to the ideative concept of culture and society, although it was 
discussed by Mead and other scholars under the notion of Generalized Other 
(Mead 1937: 152–164) that, amongst other things, is also “the seat of the self ” 
(Mead 1938: 193). Evaluating and making decisions about the semiotic essence 
and the scale of the meaning of gestures, as well as other second-order signs, 
bring forth a highly interesting link between diverse semiotic systems that use 
‘conditioned units’ as the target of study. While Pavlov’s work is traditionally 
associated with the study of ‘reflexes’, Mead’s logic of gestures is explanatory also 
for understanding Pavlov’s own and the Pavlovian discourse in general as having 
the Mind for the eventual goal of research. Mead, of course, connects the notion 
of conditioned reflexes with the faculty of consciousness to reach human semiotic 
behaviour as symbolic:
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Th e symbol is thus more than a mere substitute stimulus – more than a mere 
stimulus for a conditioned response or refl ex. For the conditioned refl ex  – 
the response to a mere substitute stimulus  – does not or need not involve 
consciousness; whereas the response to a symbol does and must involve 
consciousness. Conditioned refl exes plus consciousness of the attitudes and 
meanings they involve are what constitute language, and hence lay the basis, or 
comprise the mechanism for, thought and intelligent conduct. (Mead 1937: 122)
Of course, it is a specific issue how consciousness and intentionality connect here 
with each other, but clearly human semiotic behaviour comprises conditioning 
reflexes both of first- and second-order sign systems. In so doing, also the 
individual and the social are combined, and in such habitual behaviour we must 
additionally take into account the human practise of self-conditioning as leading, 
in combination with sociocultural conditioning of symbolic and other conduct, to 
the Self as a result of reflexivity. Reflexivity, in this sense, fully deserves attention 
as a matter for heuristic word-play pointing both at first-order reflexes and 
intentional self-conditioning in the use of second-order signs such as symbols. 
Likewise, reflexivity points at the role of consciousness at self-conditioning as 
comprising also the conditioning of the Self.
 Yet another remark should be made in connection with gestures. Gestures 
may be regarded as merely potentially semiotic units of communication, and they 
can also be seen as developed in the course of interaction. They can be taken to 
the level of abstractness that is connected with the societal scale, and logically 
also with the process of learning. That is another connection with the ‘natural’ 
and the ‘cultural’ sign systems, because in the vocabulary of systems theory, there 
comes forth a new fundamental ground for objective study of second-order 
signs (or secondary sign systems, semiotic systems, etc.) as related to the pretty 
much undisputed study of first-order sign systems as understood by Pavlov. That 
heuristic link can probably best be illustrated by the concept of anomic behaviour 
as brought to wider public by Émile Durkheim in 1897 (Durkheim 1966). 
Studying aberrant or deviant behaviour is usually seen as based on quite objective 
and observable facts that can be patterned and explained, and even repaired and 
re-socialized with practical considerations in mind. As a possible attempt of so-
to-speak semiotic reverse engineering, it would be logical to try to apply a similar 
approach also to “gestures” of a diverse semiotic range.
 Obviously, when looking at the several levels of the semiotic potential of 
gestures simultaneously with their character in terms of exchange (and change) of 
‘energy’ and ‘information’, Saussure’s soundwaves as forms of kinetic energy belong 
to the forefront of attention. If soundwaves as a form of kinetic energy bear semiotic 
information, they also serve as primary sign systems forming ground for further 
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solution of semiotic potentiality. This can, perhaps, be at simplest exemplified by 
cases of soundwaves that end at the psychological level as interpreted possibly 
differently from the addresser’s intentions. Such misunderstanding that results 
from the interpretation of meaning-carrying energetic stimuli into entities of 
different information in the semiotic sense seems, however, to be one of the most 
innocent cases of discrepancies between the coding and decoding of messages. 
Much deeper issues lay behind the motivational background of gestures, and the 
dynamism that concerns them being either conditioned or not conditioned as 
responses to basic and derived drives in Bronislaw Malinowski’s (1944) terms. 
Mead himself made it rather clear that gestures can be of diverse degree of 
semioticity, and Malinowski’s view on basic needs and derived needs repeats 
the complicated nature of relations between behaviour in the umwelt and in the 
sociocultural reality, as it were. The road between the bodily and the cultural, 
between the conditioned and the unconditioned, between the perceptional and the 
cognitive, is bidirectional: “symbolism, in its essential nature, is the modification of 
the original organism which allows the transformation of a physiological drive into 
a cultural value” (Malinowski 1944: 132). Furthermore, or maybe just in different 
words, circulation between energy and information, and between different forms 
of energy and forms of information, seems to be in an evident connection with 
the Peircean discourse on levels or stages of semiosis (in terms of the ‘-nesses’; 
CP 3.422) as also with the very build-up of the ‘ground’ for sign-creation (see CP 
1.551). Curiously, it seems that especially in today’s global processes and diverse 
virtualities we eventually reach the situation in which it will be quite difficult to 
discriminate between energy and information as it used to be pretty habitual in 
the systems theory or informational/cybernetic semiotics.
Crystallization
Primary and secondary sign systems or first- and second-order systems must, 
obviously, be handled in a certain coherence based on their logical affinity. In the 
context of semiotics, more specifically in cultural semiotics, secondary modelling 
systems are treated as those semiotic systems that are based on natural language. 
In the traditional semiotics of culture, it is hardly the case that explanations of 
primary modelling systems could be met. In the culturo-semiotic original usage, 
primary modelling systems do not exist in plural, since the foundation for 
secondary modelling is simply natural language, and the latter is not paid too 
much attention in semiotic terms other than as already connected with linguistics 
and linguistic semiotics in particular. Yet being hardly able to find other implicit 
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definitions of the primary modelling system as referring to natural language, one 
of the most straightforward characterizations of secondary modelling systems is 
the following:
Th e systems that are founded on natural language and that obtain additional 
superstructures that form a second-order language, can conveniently be called 
secondary modelling systems. (Lotman 1967: 131)
Although being a third definition and the last in a row (the first two were 
published in 1965), it shortly and neatly sums up the culturosemiotic conception 
of hierarchical modelling. Any kind of understanding of semiosis and semiotic 
processes as describable on several levels obviously presumes some kind of 
connection between them and it can hardly be imagined how grading semiosis 
could avoid the concept of hierarchy (cf. Sonesson 2009). Connections between 
sign systems of diverse levels entail certain similarities of semiosic processes going 
on in them. Whereas the culturosemiotic approach merely speaks of secondary 
modelling systems as based on the primary one (natural language), Pavlov was 
very straightforward in his discourse which departed from the assumption that we 
can speak of first-order signs and second-order signs as reflexes and conditioned 
reflexes. It is clear that one of the main prerequisites making it possible to speak 
about cultural spaces or semiotic realities consists in connections and links 
between cultural sign systems, or secondary modelling systems in the language 
of the TMS. These links concern both the grammar (or regulations for using 
sign systems), the vocabulary available for expression, and semiotic units or 
conceptions available for the members of a socium. This understanding has been 
accepted and routinized in intertextual, intersemiosic cultural analysis dedicated 
to the wide palette of cultural activities.
 Still another issue concerns connections between diverse levels of modelling. 
Hereby it is even not important how to name them – primary and secondary 
modelling systems, or primary, secondary and tertiary sign systems, or umwelt 
and Lebenswelt, or first- and second-order signs. Thinking about the formation 
of systems in general, one process in the set is crystallization. The term is usually 
associated with hard sciences where it is used to describe certain processes in 
nature. Generally put and in a common-sense understanding, the crystallization 
process consists of nucleation and crystal growth. The concept has been adopted 
in the study of humans, culture and society as well, and on a considerable scale. 
When thinking about systems that are semiotic in their essence, we cannot avoid 
the notion, and importance, of crystallization. Yet in the context of semiotics 
and other essentially semiotic ways of theorizing, the meaning of crystallization 
 From systematic semiotic modelling to pseudointentional reference 31
becomes at least double. Perhaps firstly and mostly and most importantly, the 
concept of crystallization is used to describe relations between certain items 
or groups of items in a manner in which they so-to-speak confirm each other. 
First, in the process of crystallization relations between diverse realms merge and 
combine; crystallization fixes realities of different kinds. In most general terms, 
these realities may concern Karl Popper’s three worlds and interaction between 
them (see e.g. Popper 1972: 153–165). 
Second, mutual interdependent reasserting of and drawing on one another 
can also occur between environments of miscellaneous kinds, e.g. the social, 
the geographic, the cosmological and the cosmogonic, and so forth – as is the 
case with world-views following strict principles (e.g. anthropomorphism, 
Christianity). By and large, crystallization holds for different dimensions of 
semioticized realities, and first and foremost for issues of processes and levels 
of meaning-making itself. Sharing views on the logic of modelling involved in 
various treatments of man both as a biological and a cultural being, it is easy to see 
how levels of semiotization unite semiotics with systems theory even by Pavlov’s 
idea of conditioned reflexes. The latter can be understood as simultaneously the 
foundation and prerequisite for crystallization of semiosic relations at any given 
level of semiotic systems.
 Third, for semiotics, crystallization has also been about relations between 
semiotic realities and relationships between sign-users. That is, between the social 
and the individual share of sign systems and the usages of the latter. Saussure, 
one of the founders of contemporary semiotics, treated crystallization in depth, 
although he quite rarely used the exact term. For him, the essence of crystallization 
was the following:
Among all the individuals that are linked together by speech, some sort of average 
will be set up: all will reproduce – not exactly of course, but approximately – the 
same signs united with the same concepts. (Saussure 1959: 13)
Such a somewhat levelled, institutionalized view on semiotic competence of 
associating sound-images and concepts in a socium can be seen as the fourth 
aspect of crystallization important for the present context. Asking questions such 
as how the social crystallization of language comes about, or which parts of the 
circuit are involved (Saussure 1959: 13), Saussure’s logical conclusion was that 
the responsible faculties concern natural language and its active use in speech 
communities. The essence and structure, the grammar of a language can be 
studied through the speech circuit which was one possible elementary research 
unit for semiology. It is (maybe one of) the elementary unit(s) of which and 
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from which semiology can obtain data through actual observership (notice, 
of course, an apparent comparison to the ‘pragmatic dimension’ of semiotics), 
allowing semiology to diverge explicitly from merely philosophical theorizing, 
and to approach social sciences, maybe even sciences in general. Of course, this 
is arguable in the sense that semiotic research is essentially scientific, as opposed 
to philosophizing – in principle, has been so ever since the beginning. So again – 
for Saussure, the speech circuit consisted of three main levels or stages, from 
among which the psychological one was the most important. It is exactly the 
psychological level on which the construction of signs takes place. So again there 
emerges the conviction that all begins in the Mind where in Saussure’s view sound 
images and concepts become glued together in the process of sign-building. The 
associative and coordinative “faculty plays the dominant role in the organization 
of language as a system” (Saussure 1959: 13). Thus speech circuit can be seen as 
a kind of an earlier reflex arc (cf. Dewey’s reflections on this below), or now a 
societal method and practice to crystallize second-order signs and sign systems in 
systemic processes of interpersonal (and also autocommunicative) conditioning.
 Crystallization is exactly what makes a modelling system distinct and what 
makes a modelling system a detectable unit or a holon in terms of systems 
theory. Crystallization is essential for maintaining the stability of sign systems, 
while an important feature of those systems is them being institutions with 
significant inertia. Amongst other nuances, this means that crystallization is 
a process responsible for the formation of signs, and  – to recall the scientific 
aspect of crystallization – also for the establishment of paradigms of denotative 
and connotative relations between concepts. The third moment hinted at the 
importance of crystallization of the semiotic reality and articulation devices as sign 
systems – this is what binds individuals into societies with ideas about common 
communicative reality and manners of communication. 
 Interestingly, there is also a fifth aspect concerning crystallization. This is 
simultaneously a separate nuance, a feature binding the first three aspects together 
that also has an impact in the sense in which Popper treated a certain unity, or 
at least a communal strive for unity, between the three worlds of the human 
meaningful realm. Vilfredo Pareto, as one of the founding fathers of contemporary 
humanities, social sciences and sciences who has largely been forgotten by now, 
treated the process of crystallization as determining relations between sign systems 
and the external reality, so to speak. More exactly he was concerned with the 
relations between languages, metalanguages and facts, basically preceding Popper’s 
above-mentioned discourse for decades. Talking about relations between words 
and facts in theorems, Pareto (1935: 60–61) says:
 From systematic semiotic modelling to pseudointentional reference 33
Ordinary language crystallizes and preserves them, and it is there that we can 
recover and use them, but always with the reservation that, roughly approximative 
and true only within certain limits (which as a rule are unknown to us), they 
become false outside those limits […]. Such theorems are theorems of words 
rather than of things […]. 
It is clear that whilst the problem of crystallized relations between concepts, words 
and things already concerns metalanguage, it is even more acute on the level of 
natural language as a modelling and expression device in societies themselves. 
The nature of natural language as misleading in its inherent proposals for treating 
diverse environments extends the realm of linguistic units and also applies to 
the unification of social, economic, cosmological, geographical and many other 
realities. The unification of meaningful environments and enlargement of the 
areas of their semiotic overlap indeed increases the coherence of the semiotic 
reality, but also of the latter and the geographical and biological reality. However, 
unfortunately it oftentimes does not mean expansion of the three worlds (the 
physical, the mental and the representational-theoretical) in Popper’s sense, but 
leads exactly to the state Pareto warned us about: the worlds of signs, things and 
objects get mixed up. At the milder end of the scale self-referential loops of the 
so-to-speak reality-pseudo-check might then occur that may be built on the 
diverse dimensions and spheres of sociocultural reality, while at the more severe 
end of the axis there quite weird examples can be found of trying to adjust the 
physical world to the theoretical, or even to the more individual mental world. 
Adventurous undertakings from recent history can serve as examples here, e.g. the 
attempts by the Spanish conquistadors to drain Lake Guatavita in order to reach 
El Dorado in the 16th century; or the so-called Four Pests Campaign in China; 
or even “improving nature” by the Soviets when they realized the “uselessness” of 
Siberian rivers flowing into the Arctic Ocean with no economic benefit and made 
plans to reverse the flow of those rivers.
 Another aspect of crystallization of ties between concepts and sound-images 
extends the level of signs themselves and goes for utterances, predicates and 
predicate subjects. There exists an effect that has been ascribed to natural language 
and is called systematic misleadingness which means the fusion of reference targets 
that has, by default, as if been suggested by natural language itself. That is, in the 
expression of opinions, evaluations, “facts”, we oftentimes witness self-reference 
and self-characterization of the utterer(s) instead. However, our problems are not 
limited only to that “the world is no longer the world of our immediate sensations”; 
nor only that “it is as if language were a great seducer disguising “reality”” as 
suggested by Floyd Merrell (Merrell 1995: 30; 30ff). Besides evident cases of 
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bending the discourse and the sphere of reference by connotation or modalization, 
joking, irony or other techniques that mostly depend on the communicational 
context, the very syntactic and even lexical dimension of language follows much 
more hidden and devious paths. We are not any more in the realm of argument 
concerning correspondence between references, facts and expressions, or that of 
truth and falsity, or that of deceit and fiction reaching back to Augustine (for the 
latter, see Gramigna 2018: 145–193). Fusion of the ontologically objective and 
subjective, epistemically objective and subjective, and purely virtual references 
nevertheless starts off from the level of natural language. One of the best-known 
authors who started to treat this subject, Gilbert Ryle, describes systematically 
misleading expressions via examples in which, while seemingly speaking about 
the world (including both physical phenomena and cultural units), we are actually 
often speaking about ourselves or several other possible predicate(d) subjects – 
about everything else but the explicitly seeming target itself. Ryle discloses the 
fusion of reference spheres by cases like “Jones is popular”, which is not about the 
predicate subject appearing in the utterance, but rather describes those people 
and their evaluation standards amongst whom Jones is popular (Ryle 1992: 98). 
Of course, much more devious circumstances are involved with the so-to-speak 
artificially created reference objects. The latter, however, appear oftentimes as 
taken for granted in daily discourse and include probable objects and fictional or 
artificial constructs such as ‘devil’, ‘capitalism’, ‘communist’, ‘fake hero’, ‘unicorn’ 
and the like. Cases of higher complexity apply to differentiating between real facts, 
probable facts, impossible facts or objects. These have to do with matters where 
logic, linguistics, social reality and cultural logic intersect; these issues have found 
treatment throughout social sciences and humanities and can at present be found 
already in quite foundational works. For example, Pareto, when he discussed John 
Doe’s ability – and the relevant linguistic and logical rates of possibility – to dine 
with his head cut off, was speaking of virtual movements exactly in the sense of how 
powerful natural language’s impact is on social facts in terms of determining ‘classes 
of possible things’ and ‘classes of impossible things’ as they appear in logical and 
non-logical conduct (see Pareto 1935: 69).
 The systematically misleading nature of natural language and the logic of the 
creation of social facts means that crystallization appears in the management of 
the semiotic reality in daily speech and behaviour. We bind the representamens we 
use not only with objects (at least seemingly) objective, but also with the more or 
less determined interpretants. This binding, in turn, means that we are tied to the 
realities of the sign systems we use and, by this, crystallization goes hand-in-hand 
with the logic of self-reference. Crystallization and self-reference do not only make 
communication possible, but support also economization of communication. Yet 
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a side effect is cutting off the semiotic bloodstream of societies from the outer 
environment and other semiotic communities and even realities: enhanced 
internal semiotic flows cannot in principle cope with fighting against entropy, at 
least not in the long run.
Integration of out(-there-ness): non-pathological deviance
Clearly, crystallization of sign systems as combined with self-referentiality 
cohering, yet simultaneously dooming, sociocultural systems has to do with the 
inherent prerequisite of semiosis in sociocultural systems as being infinite, in 
Charles S. Peirce’s explanation (now, instead of Peirce, see Tomaselli 1999: 131–
136). Thus, just as regularities in the process of infinite semiosis can be seen as 
mere stop-overs in the overall long-term semiosic activity, there must be ways of 
breaking the crystallized structure and self-referentiality in sign systems as such 
and in general.
 Aside from the unification function, the – mildly spoken – stabilizing effect 
of self-reference for sociocultural systems has been expressed in the work of 
Claude Lévi-Strauss (e.g. Lévi-Strauss 1968[1963]) who pointed at the principle of 
crystallization on a wider scale. Diverse sociocultural spheres and topics can be in 
structural, often isomorphic, correspondence. Thus the inertia that makes semiotic 
systems socially stable and usable as institutions sometimes finds embodiment in 
the organization of artefacts up to the level of settlement organization. There are 
institutions and structures that “offer an opportunity to study social and mental 
processes through objective and crystallized external projections of them” (Lévi-
Strauss 1968[1963]: 292). Furthermore, in Lévi-Strauss’s studies we can witness 
spatial structures of settlements representing understandings of a socium of its 
various social divisions like gender, age, labour, marital status, physi(ologi)cal state. 
Likewise, nutrition and food preparation habits could be in correspondence with 
the structure of a village. In semiotically even stronger expression, Lévi-Strauss 
claimed that spatial structure is the crystallization of a society’s sociocultural 
reality: the social, cultural, cosmological, cosmogonic and other often potentially 
purely semiotic structures have been articulated in spatial structures. The positive 
correlation between mental processes, be it either on the social level or on that 
of the individual, and the physical environment the given socium has shaped, 
applies to both a settlement’s general plan as well as the architecture of individual 
buildings and houses (see Lévi-Strauss 1968[1963]: 292ff; for relevant spatial 
studies see Lagopoulos 1986).
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 Curiously though, seen from another angle, crystallization is a phenomenon 
and concept that unites diverse levels of integration described by Pitirim Sorokin 
(1957). Without crystallization there can be no communicative interaction 
between individuals, and without communication and communization of reality 
social conglomerations proper cannot form. Negotiation of reality and semiotic 
reality, just as continuous making and remaking of agreements on the proper use of 
sign systems, is the core of sociocultural systems as integrated wholes. Creation of 
out-there-ness (Potter 1996: 150–175) can be treated as a process leading to stable, 
even stagnant semiotic realities, but the possible element of innovation in this 
practice should be kept in mind as well. Negotiation of what is “really out there” is 
not merely concerned with the so-called distanced footing of one’s position on the 
creation and presentation of facts, but should also involve the presentation of what 
is really out there as discovered by the members of a socium. Such discoveries 
and re-discoveries may hold for diverse kinds of entities physically both inside 
and outside a given society, culture and their environment. In the era of modern 
information technology and global information networks, also taking into 
account the impact of marketing in consumer society, “out-there-ness” probably 
also implies the creation of several pseudorealities. Those can entail, for example, 
realities that react to current affairs in market situations, and apply both to virtual 
realities in the sense of postmodern simulacra, and to virtualities created in the 
virtual realm of computers and the internet; we can even think of ‘the Internet of 
things’ – what, truthfully, ought to be taken as its referent? Obviously, the case is no 
more about simply dealing with gadgets switched into communicative networks, 
virtual monetary systems, gadgets generating messages in networks without direct 
human help, or crossing realities (x-realities). In this sense it cannot be presumed 
by default any longer that semiotic units can be divided into sets such as object – 
representament – interpretant, signifier – signified, or signs and referents, where, 
according to Göran Sonesson’s five-point summary of the properties of the sign, 
“the referent is more indirectly known than any part of the sign” and the sign 
as a whole is “relatively independent of that for which it stands (the referent)” 
(Sonesson 2009: 138). The problem is that we are no more dealing with the logic 
of unlimited semiosis (CP 1.339) as based on interplay between the interpretant 
and the representamen, but we are faced with a situation where components of 
the sign have blended and fused into each other to the point at which the so-
called objective reality (or the realm of objects) and the semiotic reality are not 
distinguishable any more. 
 Interestingly, these issues that seemingly exist at the core of the semiotic level 
and the heart of the functioning of semiotic systems as such, have been treated 
as realities in sociocultural integration processes where social and cultural 
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layers collide and combine. In turn, understanding the nature of integration 
and integration processes helps to grasp the formation principles and essence of 
modelling systems as holons. Holons as conceptual entities conjoining the holistic 
and the atomistic points of view point out two developmental tendencies of sign 
systems: self-preservation or maintenance on the one hand, and innovation or 
text-generative potential in a culturosemiotic vocabulary on the other hand. The 
former aspect concerns crystallization in its stabilizing impact on sign systems that 
have their logical end in submission to entropy:
When the unifying force, X, is quite considerable, and the force Y – the trend 
toward innovation  – is very weak or non-existent, we get the phenomena of 
instinct in animals, and something like the situation in Sparta, a state crystallized 
in its institutions. (Pareto 1935: 95)
Thus, crystallization as a prerequisite for communal communication that might 
be seen in the light of achieving a holistic semiospherical reality simultaneously 
presents a highest danger for sign systems. A solution for this grand Catch-22 can 
be seen in the concept of habit (CP 1.390) as the key to understanding (unlimited) 
semiosis that is taking place in sign systems. Habit is the button for stops in 
the chains of unlimited semiosis  – necessary in order to enable the exchange 
of messages, but also demanding occasional breaking in order to go beyond 
regularities and the boundaries of the semiotic reality both in innovation and 
discovery. In the study of social systems, development can still be seen in processes 
balancing centripetal and centrifugal forces, and holding them in the so-called 
zone of proximal development (as the latter was famously defined in Vygotsky 
1978: 86). Regarding social systems, and in comparison with Lev Vygotsky, a 
perhaps better-fitting notion can be found to describe the key element in fighting 
against entropy – ‘non-pathological deviance’ that was coined by Walter Buckley:
[…] A requisite of sociocultural systems is the development and maintenance of a 
signifi cant level of non-pathological deviance manifest as a pool of alternate ideas 
and behaviors with respect to the traditional, institutionalized ideologies and role 
behaviors. (Buckley 1969: 495)
Interestingly, non-pathological deviance can consequently be used as a connector 
of diverse levels of institutions beginning from sign systems up to sociocultural 
systems. Without entering contradictions with the Saussurean principle of 
crystallization as a prerequisite of communication, non-pathological deviance 
offers a way out of entropic tendencies in combination with the Peircean ground 
of semiosis as both the principle of founding and alternating the path of semiosic 
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logic. Depending on the ground of semiosis, sets of paradigmatic relations can 
be fitted for extremely diverse syntagmatic chains – and this is exactly what non-
pathological deviance is all about. In this sense, it is perhaps important to note that 
non-pathological deviance does not imply the area of complete unpredictability. 
Instead, the normal and the non-pathologically deviant are comparable to human 
ontological advancement as seen by Vygotsky: 
Th e actual developmental level characterizes mental development retrospectively, 
while the zone of proximal development characterizes mental development 
prospectively. (Vygotsky 1978: 86–87)
Needless to say, besides the impact of education on individual development and 
societal influences on individual semiosic habits, prospective development of 
sociocultural mentality can be guided in the zone of proximal development by 
administrative aid from propaganda to more substantial physical means. So, the 
creation of innovative connections between traditional elements in traditional 
semiotic paradigmatic sets on a logical ground still comprehensible for a given 
socium, is a possibility of extending the boundaries of a given semiotic reality. 
Examples can be given from across the whole faculty of arts, simple word-play, 
but also entire new paradigms in the Kuhnian sense extending from the field of 
scholarship up to the establishment of grotesque social formations and totalitarian 
statehoods. 
 Relations between systems and their environment, or systems and their outside, 
are crucial for not only the developmental potential, but also for their mere 
existence in terms of overcoming entropic forces. It seems that a distinction can be 
made between at least two major angles for treating relationships of systems and 
their outside. On the one hand, there is the so-called thinking outside the system 
as it concerns non-pathological deviance. On the other hand, there obviously are 
examples of classifying certain phenomena themselves as belonging to the outside 
of a given system. By the latter we can think of things and behaviours that are 
deviant. Remarkably, inasmuch as these are real borderline phenomena here, it 
seems that we can consider both things and objects at this point, as the distinction 
was emphasized by John Deely (1994: 11), whilst a sharp line between them is 
starting to fade. It means that the reality of the ‘real’ and the ‘experienced real’ 
becomes highly questionable – also in terms of defining semiotic research objects 
on the metalevel. 
 Hereby it is important that in the case of open systems, deviant behaviour 
concerns such open behaviour the deviance of which can be measured, at least in 
the Darwinian sense. The success of behaviour can be seen in terms of feedback 
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loops beginning from daily feeding as leading to self-preservation or death up 
to the success of organisms as species. In the case of open social systems, a very 
important aspect of deviance is added: behaviour that is considered, judged 
or labelled as deviant. That means: we are already dealing with deviance not 
strictly in the frame of the evolutionary paradigm, but as with a characteristic of 
behaviour socioculturally cognised and judged. Yet in that case deviance is quite 
openly observable in the face of institutions beginning from norms and laws up 
to special institutions as prisons or asylums. Both aspects of deviant behaviour 
point out that it can be detected more easily than non-pathological deviance. 
Pathological deviance can be observed more effortlessly, and is of high value for 
the description of structures and processes in the given system. At the same time 
it can obtain diverse forms, and thus be detected in pretty dissimilar walks of life. 
Hereby we can think of extremely versatile fields that, one way or another, have to 
do with normative behaviour. Perhaps even more vividly than the description of 
the formation of a cultural tradition (Eliot 1920), we witness the recognition and 
demarcation of anomic behaviour in societal circumstances. Deviant behaviour is 
traditionally sanctioned and thus clearly visible in societal institutions, whether 
the latter exist in a physical form and as legalized institutions, or stand in semiotic 
formations starting from written grammars of sign systems to negotiated default 
behavioural patterns and social control. Such behaviour is recognized in society 
and is acted upon in one way or another, because it has clearly anomic features that 
are perceived as leading to social or cultural alienation, i.e. to the disintegration 
of the sociocultural organization. Non-pathological deviance, on the other hand, 
does not necessarily even have to be identified as such. 
 Both pathological and non-pathological deviance serve as weapons to over-
come entropic processes  – they both import new energy (also in the form of 
information) into the system. Obviously, the crucial issue for sociocultural systems 
is to recognize the threshold, beginning from which the system ceases to exist and 
either withers away, collapses, or enters another formation, i.e. becomes another 
system. One of the key methods for the analysis of the danger level of deviance 
has to do with feedback loops. Evaluating the success of individual and social 
behavioural acts in terms of measuring the adequacy of interaction between 
the social system (beginning from the individual) and its environment may at 
first glance seem quite mundane and uncontroversial. In this respect, principles 
of semiotics and systems theory appear equal: from both perspectives, the 
coherence of sociocultural systems and relations between these systems with their 
environment can be assessed in terms of interactional relevance. Yet taking into 
account the importance and the actual tendency of feedback loops in the case of 
sociocultural systems becoming autocommunicative, the preference for semiotic 
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methods of treating the coherence of behaviour on the level of sign systems and 
diverse types of texts is explicit. It means that the longitudinal delay of feedback 
loops between societies and their environments is oftentimes merely virtual, 
being autocommunicative instead. Thus “systems” as such are rather composed 
of social and cultural entities and institutions, and lack the environmental 
component. Systems theory cannot evaluate the efficacy or adequacy of actions 
by such systems, because of their self-contained nature – the only environment 
or background of action is the ideological frame or past of the system itself. In 
these cases of undeniable self-referentiality it seems that semiotic approaches are 
preferable in order to describe the logic and adequacy of sociocultural action, for 
they allow conceptualization of the context of action by the means of the systems 
themselves. For example, individual or group activities can be set into perspective 
in the framework of more general public opinion, or thought of in the formation 
of the so-called cultural tradition or cultural text.
 It has to be recognized that when speaking about communication and auto-
communication, or feedback loops and autocommunicative feedback loops, it 
is not always disclosed what is actually kept in mind. In actual communicative 
situations, it is not always a clear-cut issue whether communicative or auto-
communicative circulations are meant. The boundary between them is time-
dependent, and the latter is crucially related to dimensions or vectors of the 
environment. Obviously, the environment of sociocultural communication splits 
into very diverse domains, e.g. the social, the geographical, the cultural, the bio-
logical, and so on; and it is oftentimes quite difficult to pinpoint differences 
or boundaries between them. The definition of autocommunication is case-
dependent and has to do with the longitudinal characteristics of communication 
in sociocultural systems. Frequently, it is hard to demarcate what pertains 
to interaction with the environment and what has to do with intrasystemic 
communication, because the subject matter of communication is reflected in 
feedback only in long-term processes. Examples can be given from fields such 
as economy (how to decide which is the best or most sustainable economic 
model), or matters concerning the survival of the entire human race (like, for 
example, decisions concerning global warming). Unfortunately, the circle of such 
feedback loops is extremely extended; even worse – in most cases, the future input 
or environmental reaction to sociocultural action can only be negative. This is 
because in case of a positive reply from the environment, there would not be any 
reason for the given society to change anything in its behaviour. This means that a 
given feedback loop could not even be complete before a recognizable (negative) 
signal from the environment is given to the system acting. In this line, open 
social systems cannot but become more and more entropic. On the other hand, 
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such extended feedback loops as, for example, in the case of human action in the 
context of global warming, are logically completed by negative response signals, 
and the adequacy of human action can only be assessed post factum by the “last 
man standing”, so-to-speak. Environmental reply to sociocultural action is often 
postponed until such future so that sometimes there is even no other possibility 
than to construct informational space on the basis of intersystemic sociocultural 
communication. At first glance, both from the view of semiotics and systems 
theory, this may be perceived as a huge controversy, but on a closer look there is 
none. To put it simply, the issue may be solved by reminding of the ingredients of 
the communicative situation as described by Parsons: social, physical, and cultural 
objects may alternate their statuses (Parsons 1952: 4). While Parsons suggested 
that cultural objects can become symbolic units of identity, that is  – cultural 
objects can essentially turn into social objects, the relevant dynamism does not end 
there, but goes for all three main types of objects in the communicative situation. 
Obvious examples can be given most easily from any kind of totalitarian regimes 
such as the phenomenon of personality cult, or objectification of communication 
partners by stereotypes or in the situation of warfare. The potential of non-logical 
conduct to take over the pathways of semiosic habits in a society so as the latter 
ought to put semiotic systems and their environments into tangible relationships 
measurable by the efficiency of feedback loops, seems to guide us to semiotic 
(and not, for example, systems-theoretical) keys to describe the regularities of 
sociocultural semiotic behaviour. How communicative situations are constructed, 
how the interplay between categories of objects in those situations is socially and 
culturally organized, what are the relations and ratios between feedback loops 
proper and autocommunication  – these are issues that seem solvable through 
semiotic analysis of information circulation in public space.
Crystallization and self-referentiality
Obviously, communication is a contextual interpretative activity, and the context 
of communicative situations as defined by the three kinds of Parsonian objects of 
orientation is itself forged through that very interpretative activity. Interpretation 
in the course of semiosis shows the path to Unlimited Semiosis as seemingly 
the freest activity of the Mind. At the same time, as claimed already long ago by 
Charles Horton Cooley, the Mind is social (Cooley 1909), and should therefore 
follow certain regularities of the logic of meaning production. In the most general 
terms, it would thus seem natural that semiosis as a logical act comprising 
interpretation requires that, when dealing with its evolutionary development, we 
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rather ask “how the first forms of logic used by living beings emerge from the 
world of non-logic” (Kull 2018: 136). Yet, if – and whether or not – “semiosis is 
interpretation” (Kull 2018: 137), there nevertheless are limits of interpretation that 
can measure the rate of falsity (not quite that of correctness) of interpretation 
as discussed by Umberto Eco (1990). In the case of seeming intentionality and 
seeming referentiality, especially when taking into account the possibility of 
conditioned perception, cognition and action, there is a high chance we are not 
facing semiosis proper, but some sort of pseudosemiosis or activity only seemingly 
semiosic. This is not the place to ask whether or not semiosic freedom occurs 
in species other than Homo sapiens, but it is worthwhile keeping this quest in 
mind in the background, when intentionality confronts the topic of instinctive 
behaviour. In case of the latter, there is a wide area open for discussing the limits 
of interpretation and whether, for example, behaviour that is unsuccessful for a 
biological organism is the result of choice or a failure to respond to stimuli in 
terms of meeting requirements of instincts. Even though semiosic freedom hereby 
is probably not used quite in the sense as semiotic freedom was treated by Jesper 
Hoffmeyer (Hoffmeyer 2010), but rather as Nauta outlined a number of advancing 
types of semiosic processes (Nauta 1972), closed, open, and open social systems 
connect here in an interesting manner. Namely, if semiosis is interpretation, then 
interpretation must follow certain established meaning-making pathways in 
order to fit into any given semiotic reality. Semiosic freedom and interpretation 
are confined to a semiotic environment that must possess the quality of certain 
stability in order to make communication possible. That environment is shared 
by parties of communication, but communicative and semiosic unity probably 
extends also to the realm of referential reality in the dimensions of both cognition 
and perception. This unity between agents, processes and structures engaged in 
semiosis and communication has oftentimes been described through the notion 
of crystallization.
Whereas for Saussure, crystallization was clearly an extremely important 
aspect for the functioning of the speech circuit – keeping in mind both individual 
and social communication, it thus has to do not only with the possibly covert 
semiosic processes, but also with what is described by the word and concept 
of communication. Here surfaces another flashback for cultural semiotics in its 
treatment of culture (text, subject, etc.) as a modelling system operating through 
the two main data-transfer mechanisms: communication and autocommunication. 
Basically, in the TMS’s culturosemiotic ideas on autocommunication and 
communication Saussure’s language at its individual and social level is at stake. 
These levels are firmly connected through crystallization.
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 From another viewpoint, autocommunication and communication connect 
cultural semiotics  – through crystallization  – again with systems theory. The 
issue at point has to do with understanding changes that occur in movement from 
closed systems to open social systems. A major difference between systems at each 
end of the axis has to do with the nature of feedback loops between the system 
and its environment. Closed systems (e.g. mechanical, geological, etc.) connect 
with their environment through such feedback loops in which referentiality lies in 
checking the system’s reaction to certain stimuli in terms of preserving the physical 
existence of that system. In the case of closed systems, feedback can be analysed in 
terms of correctness: if a system responds to a certain stimulus in an inadequate 
manner, it simply would appear unsuccessful in its adaptation to the environment 
and would cease to exist. Obviously, the shortness of timeline for such a reality 
check plays a role as well, also if we follow a different logical trail – probabilities 
for “correcting” response(s) to stimuli are extremely limited for closed systems. 
For example, in the case of “wrong answers”, a zoological specimen or even species 
would simply become extinct. In other words, in the case of closed systems, only 
communication and referentiality that hold between a system and its environment 
appear as relevant. 
A major point of interest and concern has to do with relations between 
referentiality and intentionality. Evidently, there is a requirement for referentiality 
of actions of closed systems (as also biological systems) in terms of reality check 
of the correctness of responses to stimuli (e.g. survival as mentioned). Such 
referentiality may or may not be intentional, and/or that intentionality may be 
both conscious and unconscious. From the semiotic viewpoint the issue is of 
utmost importance, since it is, amongst other things, a factor to determine the 
subject matter of semiotics – the question concerns the semiotic threshold. Not all 
behaviour that can be rendered as referentially targeted is intentional and thus not 
all “indexically correct” links between systems, their actions and environments are 
necessarily semiotic. Instead, they can be mechanical, physical, chemical or other 
relations qualifiable as correct, but nevertheless belonging to the sphere of the so-
called brute facts or mere things. On the other hand – not all relations between 
systems and their environments must necessarily be strictly referential in indexical 
terms, but may merely be symbolic. This means that besides situations involving 
unintentional correct indexical relations between systems and their environs, there 
can be other cases as well. Those are, for example, intentional sign processes that 
are built on somehow incorrect referential relations that result in false indexicality. 
It is of utmost importance that the latter cases not be reduced to merely being 
mistaken or lying, because the age of the virtualization of reality has taken us to 
entirely novel semiotic relations between systems and their surroundings, as well 
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as to completely new structural logic in the build-up and behaviour of systems as 
such. Today one cannot any more talk about three kinds of factoriality (proper 
parts, properties, and perspectives) defining conceivable objects and forming the 
ground of indexicality as proposed by Sonesson (2009: 147). This is due to not 
only the fusion of the semiotic reality with what ‘is out there’, but also because 
what could be listed in the categories of the three factors can in principle change its 
very status. One reason for this is a fundamental modification of relations between 
intensional and extensional relations and hierarchies. The wider an extensional 
set is, the more possible it is to modify intensional properties: what previously 
could be defined as parts by their status, can become properties (e.g. Donald 
Trump as a member of society and Trumpness as a distinctive feature; the modern 
Prometheus, etc.). Complex issues between referentiality and intentionality, 
conscious and unconscious behaviour, indexical and symbolic relations sometimes 
blur the boundaries between closed and open systems, especially between closed 
systems and open social systems.
 Building correct referential relations between the system and its environment 
is a developmental inevitability for biological systems, and the accuracy of such 
referentiality can be verified regardless of its potential intentional component. 
Sebeok discussed the issue of indexical reality check by the example of the 
movement patterns of the bacterium Escherichia coli, and used exactly the phrase 
‘seeming intentionality’ (Sebeok 1990: 14) to raise the question of whether 
correct indexical clues that form a coherent referential reality can be associated 
with intentionality as stepping over the semiotic threshold. The topic becomes 
exceedingly more interesting when we add another argument and quest: if there 
exist coherent referential realities as for example umwelten in the case of biological 
systems, then the accuracy of feedback loops must logically somehow relate to the 
realm of memory. In the case of intentional open systems it is clear that one of their 
holon-construction components is memory. From another viewpoint it is also clear 
that we can talk about the so-called muscle memory (in a fairly broad sense of the 
word as being a form of procedural memory) in the actions of systems that cannot 
be described in terms of intentionality on the level of their overt behaviour. 
However, once we have stepped over the threshold of semiosis, there must be 
certain – possibly isomorphic – similarities of semiosic institutions of different 
levels and/or domains of semiotic systems. The elementary units of the latter 
depend on our definition of the semiotic threshold, but in the case of sociocultural 
institutions they extend from sign systems to social organizations, from the 
individual to sociocultural systems. It seems important that the multiplication 
of levels/domains of semiosis probably should not bring along the multiplication 
of semiosic processes themselves on those levels, although there can be several 
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(limited) types of logic of semiosis at each of these levels. Novel levels and domains 
of semiosis may be discovered, but the semiosic process(es) remain essentially 
the same, even if not universal. The semiosic process(es) may be called by diverse 
names, for example iconic, indexic, and symbolic schemes of building relations 
with the environment(s). 
 The idea of seeming intentionality raises a most interesting question: can 
indexes be conditional as well? Or, in other words, if second-order signs, e.g. 
conditioned reflexes produce a coherent semiotic reality in terms of referential 
correctness, do they necessarily exceed the semiotic threshold from the viewpoint 
of intentionality? Or yet from another angle: when the referential reality produced 
through conditioning ceases to satisfy the functional circle of an umwelt, can 
intentionality be the measure of evaluating the correctness of the referential 
reality? Can intentionality be a key to deciding on the effectiveness of feedback 
loops between systems and their environments? Or vice versa: can efficacy be a key 
to the judging of conscious intentionality guiding purposeful behaviour? Evidently, 
these issues apply both to biological as well as sociocultural systems, in the latter 
case regarding, for example, sentiments and automatisms as bonds of sociocultural 
reality. It is clear that Pavlov’s second-order signs were conditioned units, and it 
is clear that secondary modelling systems are conditioned semiotic systems as 
well, depending largely on natural language and also on lower sign systems on the 
biological level. Let me rephrase these notifications to reach the understanding 
that gestures of a different order or levels in Mead’s sense are based on semiotic 
relations where indexicality is based on conditioning. Therefore, the boundaries 
between the physical and the semiotic become blurred, and it is almost impossible 
to distinguish between the referentially accurate and the referentially incorrect 
behaviour, because in the process of conditioning the factor of intentionality has a 
high probability of becoming lost or set into the default background of automatic 
behavioural patterns. Indeed, it is quite difficult to outline the boundaries and 
structures of the umwelt (at least in the case of the contemporary Homo sapiens) as 
based on the logic of Uexküll’s functional circle, since even Merkwelt and Wirkwelt 
have largely become undistinguishable.
 If indexes can be (also) conditional, then the functioning, even more – the 
quality of functionality of secondary modelling systems as moderators of the 
semiotic reality – is under attack. Needless to mention that the functionality of 
feedback loops in the case of open social systems to which the logic of secondary 
modelling applies, differs from closed systems and also from biological systems. 
The case in point lies  – in our context  – both in a short timeline and what I 
basically a set of multiple choices that establish quite rigid limits to responses from 
the side of closed systems. On the other hand, moving on towards open systems, 
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all the more open social systems, the notion of feedback acquires quite another 
nature. And here the concepts of communication and semiosis blend already 
fundamentally. Namely, in the case of open social systems a move has been made 
from physical causality to informational causality in a purely semiotic sense. This 
means that referentiality in the case of open social systems tends to incline towards 
self-referentiality (Table 1). 
Table 1. From closed systems to open social systems: alteration of reference.
System Closed Open Open social
Causality mechanical, 
physical, chemical
physiological, 
biological
informational-semiotic
Feedback loops law-obedient 
(nature, author, 
divinity, etc.)
referential referential and seemingly 
referential
Input-output 
relevance
pre-determined determined, 
developable
conditioned-determined, 
developable, downgradeable
System’s 
sustainability 
depends on 
communication
system-environment system-
environment
system-environment
system-system
Self-referentiality indicates that a given system is sustainable, or more correctly – 
is maintained by such energy (energy that can have diverse forms  – physical 
energy, information, etc.) management that does not have to be checked against 
the environmental background system, at least not at short intervals. Self-
referentiality holds both for the system, e.g. a society, as a holon, as well as its 
parts at diverse levels such as social groups, families, individuals. In this sense the 
notion of the sociocultural system acquires a clarifying significance: culture forms 
an environment for social systems, and this environment may be understood as 
such text of culture, as a tradition that constitutes a major pillar of the identity 
discourse of social units. Thus, culture becomes an important measure of 
behavioural competence, as also a major source of input to the sociocultural stock 
of knowledge at all societal levels. Cultural competence and behavioural adequacy 
are much more strongly linked than individual or societal behaviour and the 
surrounding (physical) environment. Obviously, the logic of such feedback loops 
leads from the concept of self-referentiality to the notion of cultural resistance that 
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more clearly characterizes open social systems in their predisposition to incline 
towards ignorance of environmental stimuli. Cultural resistance, here, points at 
the tendency of sociocultural systems (ranging from individuals to societies) to 
become resistant to systems other but themselves.
Semiotic insularization from sign systems to 
sociocultural systems
Seeming referentiality and cultural resistance hint at the paradox that sociocultural 
systems that ought to be open systems par excellence oftentimes turn out to be 
closed as such in several meanings. First of all, of course what strikes the eye and 
was treated above the most is that we are dealing with individual and sociocultural 
institutions practising inadequate or indifferent responses to environmental 
stimuli  – this primarily goes for autocommunicative feedback loops. Second, 
the need for coherence between modelling systems forming the semiotic reality 
may lead to uniformity of these semiotic systems, and we end up with a certain 
homology between them. For example, the literary, the musical, the theatrical and 
other codes that originally have been characteristic of specific areas of cultural 
activity or individual masterpieces that have been born in a specific culture 
field, may turn into intersemiosic and transmedial wholes or cultural topics (e.g. 
‘Hamlet’, ‘redemption’, ‘Stalinism’, ‘love’) that can be described as macrosignifieds 
(for the latter see Danesi, Perron 1999: 294). Also, homological dynamism between 
culture core and the periphery has been noticed, for example, in the process of 
the creation and eventual withering of subcultures as self-contained systems (e.g. 
Hebdige 1979: 113–117). Third, by crystallization on the elementary level of sign 
systems, that is, at the formation of associative ties between sound-images and 
concepts, sign systems become as inert as apt for stagnation. Fourth, we can recall 
Marshall McLuhan’s famous statement of the medium being the message: “[…] 
the “content“ of any medium is always another medium” (McLuhan 1965: 8). It is 
noteworthy that McLuhan uses interpolation: “content” links with our topic and 
discourse by hinting at autocommunicative feedback loops that do not even have 
to have anything to do with any content whatsoever. Instead, autocommunicative 
feedback loops can possibly end up being completely redundant in terms of 
overcoding messages that circulate in the public informational space (e.g. memes 
like ‘the Russian soul’ that lose actual reference by becoming highly undefinable). 
 Whilst McLuhan dealt with seeming referentiality mostly in the context of mass 
media, then even nowadays it is worthwhile asking about seeming referentiality 
as connected with the somewhat pseudo-semiotic field of activity related to the 
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build-up of mass culture in the light of globalization. It is commonly taken for 
granted that globalization is a phenomenon opening channels, realms of reference, 
sign systems to unlimited number of communicators. Yet we can see how mass 
culture has taken the advantage of the logic of cultural production that has been 
initiated in cultural peripheries by launching specific subcultures that then have 
been developed into mass-cultural movements. Examples that are not to be confused 
with some culturally central phenomena could be provided by big mass production 
companies that aim at covering the whole pyramid of needs of people. Indeed, 
the logic how cultural periphery has borrowed or hijacked elements and culture 
topics from the mainstream, shows the ease how novel (sub)cultural realities can be 
artificially created and turned into oftentimes pseudoreferential realms where the 
referential logic between signs, objects and things becomes vague. This blurring of 
boundaries between the core and the periphery, between the sociocultural reality 
and subcultural (often virtual) reality, and eventually between the referential and 
the pseudoreferential reality is nowadays supported by virtual communities and 
global computational facilities. One might just think of the ‘World of Coca-Cola’ 
and the like from these several aspects, starting from furnishing one’s life literally 
and semiotically with items provided by a single company, to the formation of 
global subcultural communities that are largely virtual, but still based on a shared 
imaginary culture topics (think of, for example, Santa Claus and Christmas). On 
the other hand – globalization itself is so tightly connected with the technological 
availabilities of individuals and communities that it leads to the formation of 
informational or semiotic islands that tend to become rather isolated.
 These two topics, especially semiotic insularization, are too vast to be developed 
in depth here, but at the moment it is important that they describe semiotically 
(or administratively) totalitarian regimes that build themselves up on such a high 
level of autocommunicativity that they become self-referential, largely at the 
same time just seemingly referential. It is such open social systems in particular 
regarding which we meet the paradoxical situation of open systems becoming 
closed in terms of systems theory. And it is especially worthy of attention that 
virtual communities become similar to closed totalitarian regimes: instead of 
relating themselves to a potentially infinite number of other semiotic communities 
they rather cut off alternative information flows into their own semiotic sphere, 
and turn themselves into semiotic islands. This process seems to be supported by 
advancing from acknowledging the medium as a message to an even more explicit 
mixture of mediating and practising. As we know, contemporary understanding 
of how to use sign systems to establish – not only to mediate – reality (not only 
semiotic reality), can be associated with the speech act theory (Austin 1962). 
Today, techno logies and semiotic technologies are mixed, and this mixture extends 
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to the fusion of mediating reality and practising in and with reality. In this process, 
the traditional components of the communicative chain (e.g. sender, receiver, 
channel, context, noise, message) also seem to become merged, as they all blend with 
the very notion of communication itself as well. Both technical and semiotic coding, 
decoding, and amending of meanings in messages entail certain rearrangements of 
the very structural components of the referential reality (or realities). For example, 
in the computerized social media and in virtual sociocultural networks, we can see 
how 
[…] discourses transform the components of social practices (participants, 
activities, times, locations, presentation styles, performance models, and eligibility 
conditions) through additions, deletions, substitutions and rearrangements. 
(Djonov, Leeuwen 2018: 660)
In this sense, it should be asked “how particular [social] media technologies 
restructure the activities and practices that make up social communication” 
(Poulsen et al. 2018: 594).
 In semiotic islands, informational feedback loops rather tend to be founded 
on the so-to-speak closed circuits in which the “reality check” is based on the 
historical, social and cultural traditions of the given community itself. We can 
recall suitable examples from history (e.g. the Roman Empire, Czarist Russia), as 
well as from today in all the relevant political, cultural and social aspects (again, 
totalitarian regimes as vividly represented by, for example, North Korea). Likewise, 
cultural resistance is exemplified by the collapse of the culture of the Easter Island 
as caused largely by extensive “cultural activity” that ignored informational (and 
other energetic) input from the natural environment. Problems similar with the 
latter can be noticed in the contemporary discussion about the need to continue 
“modern sociocultural and economic development” as set in the context of global 
warming. ‘Global warming’ is an example of a culture topic in public informational 
space that should, in principle, excellently show links between the semiotic system 
of a social organization and its physical environment. It is considered as the most 
important topic of discussion and action in contemporary world, and still the 
humanity has not yet reached a verdict of correct activities to be undertaken. 
Solutions foreseen are opinion-based and cannot be subjected to reality check 
because the feedback loop with environment is extremely stretched in time. As 
already mentioned above, the accuracy of relevant activities can be evaluated only 
too late, post factum: whether mankind’s environmental behaviour has been and 
will be correct in terms of sustaining both the social semiotic system and the 
environmental system can literally be decided by the last man standing.
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 Therefore, probably instead of securing the social system in its natural en-
vironment, the cultural topic of global warming is built up through discursive 
feedback loops. Individual discursive activity (and thus physical activity as 
well) gets input from public information space and adds its output to that very 
same informational space, and indeed: we are dealing with autocommunicative 
feedback loops. From the individual’s viewpoint this is likely and even expected, 
for her/his survival in contemporary society primarily depends on social and 
cultural factors. Essential distancing of oneself from mainstream discursive 
standpoints – whether these support or deny the specific idea of global warming 
is of no importance here – would mean positioning oneself outside the prevailing 
evaluative and semiotic public space. That, in turn, puts the individual in much 
more perceivable survival danger than global warming as an environmental 
process. Getting ridiculed in public space for one’s diverging opinion, obtaining 
the status of a semiotic outlaw or losing one’s job thereafter has a much more 
realistic effect on daily life than global warming as a so-called “brute fact”. Thus it 
is even expected that many cultural topics that are connected with environmental 
issues or other themes not directly linked to the given community, and that should 
be arranged in logical feedback relations with environments, other cultures or 
societies, become autocommunicative instead. Feedback loops rather function 
between the individual subject and its sociocultural body, not directly between 
a semiotic subject and the biological-geographic environment it lives in. These 
arrangements can be described through the notion of cultural resistance, but not 
so as to question or combat a dominant power. Rather, I have in mind how the 
world is viewed and conceived through the rose-coloured glasses of culture (that 
do not hold merely for Medieval times), oftentimes disregarding inconvenient 
items, processes, phenomena that can be stumbled upon in the environment. In 
such examples, cultural resistance usually follows the Münchhausen style of self-
sustainability that will most likely lead to eventual deep discrepancies between a 
given system and its environment(s). The denial of environmental changes – in 
whatever kind of environment – truly leads to pulling oneself out of the swamp of 
culture by one’s own hair. However, the air above that swamp still contains just the 
semiotic units and informational space of that very same semiosphere...
 Thus, on the one hand, crystallization is an unavoidable necessity for under-
taking possible interpersonal – and therefore also intercultural – communication. 
On the other hand, crystallization, when combined with or necessarily leading 
to semiotic routinization of a certain degree, directs to cultural resistance in the 
meaning described above. This means that in order to function as open systems 
in the sense of symbolic (symbols as contrasted to signals) management of infor-
mation and allowing open communication between parts of such systems, as well 
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as open intersystemic communication, such modelling systems need a certain degree 
of crystallization on the level of sign systems. And, as already suggested, crystal-
lization, in the end, may probably lead to both semiotic and physical closure, and in 
a paradoxical manner, open social systems are liable to become closed. 
 And yet there is another aspect or explanation of this paradox. An escape was 
offered already by Pareto in his treatment of human conduct as essentially, or at 
least mostly, non-logical. Even if the non-logical nature of behaviour could be pin-
pointed by individuals or larger social bodies, it is transformed into the logical by 
description and explanation (Pareto 1935: 88ff), and the predominance of non-
logical action in the given social organization is assured by varnishing it with logic. 
It is vital to grasp non-logical individual and societal action as neither irrational 
nor completely illogical. The non-logical has to do with what can, through systems 
theory, be associated with self-referentiality and the (seemingly) paradoxical 
self-sustainability that in the end is actually the type of conduct and discourse 
forming the backbone of sociocultural identity of social open systems. In the case 
of open social, or open sociocultural, systems the case is not about their being in 
the so-to-speak ordinary state. Instead, it is about open social systems forming 
sociocultural systems in the way they are based on semiosic crystallization. Exactly 
that leads to Pareto’s ‘non-logical conduct’ which is still apt in logic, since that 
kind of social behaviour is not ‘illogical’ (Pareto 1935: 77). ‘Non-logical’ does not 
equal with behaviour without logic or rationality; non-logical conduct, in Pareto’s 
terms, does not equal with irrational behaviour. If we recall the topic of trying to 
measure the efficacy of social systems by sustainability and tie the latter term with 
normal, deviant and non-pathologically deviant behaviour, then we shall probably 
find ourselves in a dead end, because in the light of the concept of non-logical 
conduct, the degree of deviance in terms of efficiency or pathology of sustainable 
development loses all meaning.
 The ‘non-logical’ nature of societal behaviour is fundamentally connected 
with developments and semiotic changes that occur with the alternation of the 
nature of systems when we proceed from the mechanical (or physical-chemical) 
systems to the biological, and then to psychological and sociocultural, systems. 
Moving from systems operating via feedback loops initiated by environmental 
stimuli (in the physical, mechanical, chemical sense) to informational or semiotic 
causality, systems become looser in their connection with physical events, and 
feedback loops tend to be built on information exchange and intra-systemic 
semiotic relations. From here it is already easy to see such relations between 
societal and cultural entities that are built on the principle of self-referentiality. 
Self-referentiality has, of course, diverse aspects, but in order to connect with 
Pareto’s argument, it is useful to see sociocultural modelling systems in their 
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autocommunicative functioning (in the culturosemiotic sense). The latter should 
be taken in the light of culture’s self-generation as described by T. S. Eliot in his 
treatment of culture as tradition (Eliot 1920: 42–53) to which social agents adapt 
themselves. It is noteworthy that Eliot’s concept of culture as tradition was not 
only the origin for postmodern philosophizing about the Death of the Author, 
but can also be seen as a component in the description of actual sociocultural 
systems as based on integration and dynamism between the social and the cultural 
counterparts (e.g. Sorokin 1957; Ruesch 1972). This really provides a key to 
understanding the essence of ‘modelling systems’ as founded on and acting in 
‘social systems’. 
Modelling, communication and interaction go on not only between human 
beings, social groups or societies, these processes also describe relations between 
cultural and social units of different scales. This means that sociocultural systems are 
genuinely semiotic, and not even describable merely in terms of societal or cultural 
theories alone. The apparent essence of the Peircean paradigm lying in relations 
and in the Mind has been discussed so extensively that it is not reasonable to stop 
over it again at the moment. Nevertheless, looking back from Peirce at Saussure, the 
connection of the pragmati(ci)st semiotics and cultural semiotics can be noticed. 
Just as Peirce and Saussure are related in comprehending the location of semiosis 
in the Mind, they stage semiosis at multiple levels such as the creation of the sign, 
transformation of signs afterwards in neural or communicative systems, forming 
signs and sign systems as establishments and institutions. How else could the process 
be called when associations of signs are transmitted and usually transformed in this 
transmission to levels other than the Mind, in any other way than having to do with 
dissimilar modelling systems?
 Looking at cultural semiotics from the pragmatist view (especially Cooley and 
Mead), we can see other connections, especially when using filters such as Piaget, 
and all the more Vygotsky. Through Piaget, we can see the connection of the TMS 
modelling systems and Peirce’s logic of the semiosic development: Piaget proposed 
to describe human cognitive stages as logically following and built on each other 
semiotically sequentially. It is not by chance that ideas usually associated with 
developmental psychology about stages of modelling basically overlap with 
semiotic ideas about sign systems. Piaget named those main stages using such 
terms as ‘sensorimotor stage’, ‘preoperational stage’, ‘concrete operational stage’, 
‘formal operational stage’, going back even to the actual development of children 
(Piaget 1959). Similarly to so many other scholars, Piaget’s scheme involves 
movement from simple reflexes, first habits and primary circular reactions to 
abstract thought and metacognition in the end. This logic seems to be in coherence 
with movement from reactions of a biological system to reflexes and second 
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order signs, and seeming referentiality as an institutionalized and legitimized 
paradoxical principle of the semiotic reality. It is important that semiosic circuits 
in second-order (or as those named otherwise, but still built on umwelt-making 
semiotic arcs) sign systems do not imply only movement to semiotic causality, but 
also transfer from unidirectional logic to fuzzy logic or abductive logic. The latter 
seem to connect exactly with what Pareto kept in mind by not comparing non-
logical conduct to illogical behaviour.
Semiosic circuit: Coordinated and conditioned
Already John Dewey spoke up for recognizing the holistic nature of different 
behavioural departments when he started an argument against the ‘reflex arc’ 
more than a century ago. Dewey claimed that stimulus and response, sensation 
and motion are not to be viewed “as separate and complete entities in themselves, 
but as divisions of labor, functioning factors” (Dewey 1896: 358), and thus “the 
so-called response is not merely to the stimulus; it is into it” (Dewey 1896: 359). 
Experience and acting are connected with expectation and recognition, the ability 
to receive stimuli. He gives the example of seeing a potentially dangerous source 
of light and heat (candle) when we should speak of “seeing-of-a-light-that-means-
pain-when-contact-occurs” (Dewey 1896: 360). Dewey’s main argument at the 
time of publishing this quite ground-breaking article was against the concept 
of the reflex arc which, according to him, was to be replaced by understanding 
human behaviour rather as a circuit governed by a coordinative agency that would 
holistically bind together sensation and movement, stimulus and response. Aside 
from this proposal which is important in itself as a conceptualization of systemic 
interaction  – whether between people, or people and the environment  – that 
preceded general systems theory by decades, there are a few other things to be 
learnt from him.
 Certainly and firstly, Dewey’s idea of coordinated behavioural circuits is 
parallel to many of his contemporaries and successors (James, Saussure, Pareto, 
Mead, Vygotsky, even Uexküll, etc.): understanding behaviour started to move 
from action to interaction, the individual became an increasingly more social and 
semiotic member of the socium. Next, behaviour is to be seen as a system in a wider 
sociocultural system, and these systems are indeed systematic by nature. It is not 
necessary to enter the fairly childish discussion about accusing Dewey of (social) 
behaviourism, for another consequence from his idea of coordinated behavioural 
circuits is that only a part of them is overt, and it is highly questionable if that 
observable fragment is of decisive value for the analyst. This notification hints at 
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another important nuance to be seen in his claim that the participating faculties 
in coordinated circuits are not to be taken as entities, but as functioning factors: 
instead of (observable) structures in behaviour and in structures responsible for 
those observable entities, we should target processes in behaviour and in the 
mind. The latter is obviously that latent agency responsible for coordinating the 
functioning factors. Amongst other eventualities, we can see here a forerunning 
paradigm for the ‘Self ’, ‘Mind’, or whatever the individuality of the semiotic 
subject be called afterwards. Also, the very obvious default idea of ‘functioning 
factors’ leads, by way of later ‘socialization’ that is present in Dewey’s thought, 
through the faculty of expectation responsible for the formation of stimulus, to the 
fundamental formulation of the role of sign systems in sociocultural institutions. 
At the same time, the latter are explanatory for the factors to become functional 
in the coordinated circuits, so to speak.
 Although Dewey was speaking about a coordinated circuit of reconstruct-
ing and a reconstructed circuit of coordination governing consciousness and 
(inter)action, by outlining different functions or functioning factors in them, he 
still seems to have basically remained at the description of stages in the reflexive 
arc, albeit in an extended formula. The logical question follows if modelling 
systems indeed are psychological and semiotic, and they still possess different 
levels of functioning, can the coordinative agency be influenced or altered by 
intervention on each or several of those levels? And even though in Dewey’s 
treatment his ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ functioning faculties are sometimes 
interchangeable – coordination sometimes applies to ‘sensori-motor’ operations, 
sometimes to reconstructing operations in/of consciousness, and sometimes 
primary faculties go for sensations, sometimes for movements (Dewey 1896: 
358–360) – a link with the issue of the logic of functioning of modelling systems 
as such is obvious. Additionally – the link seems to be in correspondence with 
the very idea of dismissing the ‘arc’ for the ‘circuit’. By the essence of socialization 
and internalization of sign systems the latter can be modified, and by the logic 
of circuits of coordination, they can be modified at diverse levels of acts of the 
individual. Of course, the situation has changed dramatically by today: Dewey 
and his arc are taking place in far more conditioned circumstances: experience is 
organized so much earlier and to such an extent prior to actual contact with actual 
reference that personal contacts do not count any more for the reflex arc.
 Likewise, whilst the secondary (and further) level(s) of modelling evidently are 
grounded on the primary level, the influence can also be reversed. This is obvious 
in case of more contemporary ideas of the hypothesis of linguistic relativity and also 
those of the metaneeds. For example, as we remember from Abraham Maslow:
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Metamotives are, therefore, no longer only intrapsychic or organismic. Th ey 
are equally inner and outer. Th e metaneeds, insofar as they are inner, and the 
requiredness of all that is outside the person are each both stimulus and response 
to each other. And they move toward becoming indistinguishable, that is, toward 
fusion. (Maslow 1993[1971]: 301) 
Experience was mediated already for Dewey (1896: 358–363), and thus (inter)action 
based on coordination  – motivated (Dewey 1896: 358–370). Whereas Pavlov 
made it fairly clear how to arrange action on the primary level in the case of 
conditioned reflexes, we should also be concerned with how to describe, or 
intervene in, interaction on more complex levels that begin at what Dewey called 
“anticipatory sensation, an image, of the movements that may occur, together 
with their respective values, before attention will go to the seeing to break it up” 
(Dewey 1896: 358–368) into particulars. The importance of this notice applies to 
both innovative, regular, as well as automatic behaviour and behavioural patterns. 
Coordination of cognitive and sensori-motor operations in behavioural circuits 
encompasses both biological and culture-genetic faculties. This means that, in 
Pavlovian terms, conditioning can function both ways, and the so-called innate 
or primary needs and metaneeds can switch their positions of influencing each 
other. Although Maslow himself sometimes seems to hesitate about the locus of 
his A-needs and B-needs, we can but agree with his opinion that: 
[…] the basic needs and metaneeds that I have described are also in the strictest 
sense biological needs […]. It is for this reason that I have used the invented 
term “instinctoid” to indicate my fi rm belief that these data have already proven 
suffi  ciently that these needs are related to the fundamental structure of the human 
organism itself […]. (Maslow 1993[1971]: 22)
Obviously, behaviour in terms of secondary modelling systems largely occurs by 
default, and it is by the so-called breaching experiment (Garfinkel 1967: 35–75) 
that we can bring the principles of their functioning most radically and effectively 
to light. Otherwise a large part of sociocultural behaviour would remain on the 
level of conditioned coordinative agencies that do not necessarily have to be 
conscious of/in their acts. This is because experience is mediated by institutions 
(already for Dewey 1896: 358–363), whether these are primary or secondary 
sociocultural organizations, or sign systems.
 The point to be taken from the concept of the reflex arc as a circuit has to do 
with its very obvious conceptual relations with Uexküll’s functional circle, Pavlov’s 
conditioned reflexes, and feedback loops in open social systems. Alongside 
these, connections can be seen between these ideas of processual circles in the 
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production of signs of different types and in the developing stages of both semiotic 
and psychological levels of modelling. Summing up some of the perceptual and 
cognitive faculties of sign-processes and sign-processing mentioned above and 
to be mentioned below, I propose to speak of the cycle of semiosis in terms of 
quite concrete analytic units. Thus, the semiosic cycle can be described as: (a) 
recognition of meaningfulness, (b) application of (conditioned) crystallized 
relations between (c) sign-vehicles, (d) objects and (e) things that are (f) being 
taken into account. 
 Accepting the reality of semiotic circuits and levels of modelling, issues will 
obviously arise pertaining to the concrete analysis of these phenomena in specific 
social – and probably also cultural – actualities. This is where semiotic studies 
oftentimes have come to a stall or standstill, for the application of these ideas in 
actual fieldwork has posed the question as to what entities, which actual things 
and/or objects we should study then? It seems that this discourse ought to be 
connected with the treatment of institutions in societal studies, because that helps 
to circumscribe the research object most clearly and concretely, beginning, for 
example, from the individual and ending with the society. The combination of 
processual circles, modelling levels and institutions helps to tackle a key research 
question: how effective or correct are both physical and semiotic activities of a 
semiotic subject in its environments? This is in a most direct connection with 
measuring the efficacy of semiotic realities in terms of their degree of seeming 
indexicality. It is important that such a view and setting of the research problem 
will largely make it possible to avoid issues concerning intentionality and 
consciousness, and later to assemble the latter into a complex analysis of modelling 
systems of diverse types, beginning from the so-to-speak instinctoid essence (in 
Maslow’s sense) of individuals.
Conditioned logic: System’s integration
In case of meaning-handling systems, modelling is at stake both in identity 
discourse and in making sense of the environment or, more correctly – making 
sense of diverse so-to-speak necessary environments that are called significant 
environments in systems theory. It is about defining diverse needs, values, aims of 
functioning and semiotization of other similar systems, just as the general whole to 
which our given system belongs or feels as belonging to. Needless to say, suchlike 
semiotization or modelling involves a degree of subjectivity and culture-genetic 
semiotic activity. To put it shortly, systems – both suprasystems and subsystems as 
holons – can be defined by the degree of integration. Integration, of course, is about 
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the nature and density of diverse interactional relations between systems. In the 
case of semiotic systems, the dimension of subjectivity entails that when we talk 
about relations, we can basically talk only about significant relations. Integration 
of systems can be achieved via communication. Viewing sociocultural systems or 
cultures, communication is again – so fittingly for the current treatment – about 
conditioning. As Pitirim Sorokin (1957: 2) has put it, human culture is created 
by “the conscious or unconscious activity of two or more individuals interacting 
with one another or conditioning one another’s behavior”. Sociocultural systems, 
including individuals, communicate in and about diverse environments and on 
multiple levels. Therefore, conditioning can be about interaction on “lower” levels, 
as also having to do with purely semiotic systems and the semiotic reality. The 
connection with the Pavlovian discourse is certainly evident here, but it should 
not come as a surprise, because Sorokin was a student of Pavlov. Interaction and 
its specific features determine the type of integration and, according to Sorokin, 
there are four of these: (1) spatial or mechanical adjacency; (2) association due to 
an external factor; (3) casual or functional integration, and (4) internal or logico-
meaningful unity (Sorokin 1957: 4). It is important to note that whilst for Pavlov 
the formation of conditioned reflexes or the shaping of a conditioned umwelt 
was a very physical and real process to study, the same can be said about the 
integration process as explained by Sorokin. Interaction itself can be measured, 
its goals defined, its impact on the clarity and density of the borders of the given 
system calculated. Thus the type and degree of interaction and integration can be, 
or at least should be, verifiable. 
 There is one crucial nuance to keep in mind when describing the functioning 
of sociocultural systems by integration processes. That nuance entails the factor 
of subjectivity and means that the correlation between overt and covert behaviour 
can be both positive and negative. Subsystems working together “for the greater 
good” of a suprasystem can form a positive functional holon in terms of systems 
theory, but they may also have quite dissimilar goals of action. For example, people 
living in a shared administrative unit may have dissimilar ideals of action and 
behaviour, but work together for financial or economic reasons; that is – they may 
seem to have reached a logico-meaningful level of integration, whilst the actual 
integration is based on the functionality at best. This has been described by Jurgen 
Ruesch in his extensive study of integration from the viewpoint of acculturation 
of social groups in the general society of the United States (Ruesch 1972: 173–
226). There obviously exist frequent cases in which communication partners have 
divergent hypotheses about the level of integration on which communication is 
based. For instance, when one communication partner takes the stand of working 
together on at least the functional level of integration and eventually aims at the 
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logico-meaningful, and the other one positions him- or herself on merely the 
spatial adjacency, we can witness eventual conclusive claims like “the death of the 
multi-culti”, recognition of “terrorist activity”, “internal sabotage” or the similar.
 Another aspect of the subjectivity factor also has to do with the semiotization 
of both individual and social action, and with how action is made positively 
meaningful. This, however, concerns quite a different angle of attention: how to 
assess actions on a scale spanning from spatial adjacency to logico-meaningful 
integration? The problem lies in how the objective and the logical are connected, 
and how evaluations can be made on the level of integration on the basis of 
behaviour if its overt and covert sides can possibly differ significantly. In other 
words, or perhaps even from another viewpoint: are there gaps between the 
systemic and the semiotic aspects of holons, or are there none? Are sociocultural 
systems still systems if they lack logico-meaningful coherence, or do they 
obtain the status of closed systems as mechanical ones that are based on spatial-
mechanical adjacency? Do sociocultural actions have to possess the dimension of 
meaning, or may they simply remain on the level of survival efficacy in terms of 
efficient feedback loops between the system and its environments? 
 Evidently, these are extremely fundamental issues, as they do not only concern 
disciplinary relations between semiotics and systems theory, but also shape the 
research object. Perhaps one of the clearest examples of the meeting of systems 
theory and semiotics in the study of institutions beginning from the conventional 
level of organizations to sign systems in practical analysis comes from Pareto and 
his general sociology. Pareto described meaningful conduct, or sociocultural use 
and management of modelling systems, in a scheme comprising the individual 
psychic state, rites of worship or the sociocultural tradition, sociocultural theory 
of sense-making behaviour, and concrete conduct in a concrete communicative 
situation (Pareto 1935: 88ff). An individual behavioural act is a result of cognitive 
activity which is influenced by the public theory or communal stock of knowledge, 
but still primarily guarded or conditioned by traditional behavioural patterns. 
This means that meaning is primarily inserted into action by action itself for 
which there exist pre-established evaluation standards. As Pareto (1935: 90) puts 
it, people do not that much do things because they believe in something, but 
rather they believe in something because they do certain things. Furthermore: 
the efficacy of individual action in terms of its logical value (i.e. the means meet 
the ends) predominantly depends on the public opinion and the communal 
sociocultural knowledge. For example, when global economy collapses and falls 
into recess, in the public space of argument it does not mean that there are faults 
in the system itself, but rather that certain individuals have made mistakes or 
committed corruptive deeds, causing the system to malfunction. Or, following 
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an example from Pareto (1945: 77), “sacrifices to Poseidon and rowing with oars 
were equally logical means of navigation” in ancient Greece. That is, if an ancient 
Hellenic fisherman happened to be unlucky, then reasons for that were first to 
be sought in conducting an incorrect sacrificial ceremony before the voyage and 
communication with the gods, rather than in human inexperience or disregard 
of weather conditions. This means that sociocultural systems and cultural 
behavioural traditions tend to be regarded by mainstream (i.e. usually decisive) 
public opinion as faultless, and systems are sometimes seen as broken down by 
individual misbehaviour or malfunctioning. Explanation of failures of systems 
in terms of inefficient feedback loops with their environments as resulting from 
individual misconduct is therefore a tool in the service of turning open social 
systems into closed systems.
 Evaluation of the efficacy of behaviour by actual feedback loops between 
systems and environments is brought to an even more complex level, if we link 
Pareto’s argument with the idea of the semiotic essence of society and with the 
concept of the Self or the Mind. This brings also historical and even fictional 
characters, as well as those who exist somewhere in-between (Christ, aliens, the 
noble inhabitants of Atlantis), to the evaluation of the sanity of the behaviour of 
the spatio-temporally present community members. The community of appraisers 
of the value and logic of action is multiplied by semiotic subjects, as it is also 
multiplied by the numerous roles of physically existing individuals. At the same 
time, the importance of the latter largely depends on how close they appear to 
the microphone, so-to-speak; and thus the influence of some semiotic subjects 
physically in absentia may overpower that of those bodily present. 
A semiotic deadlock?
The potentially infinite number of evaluators and goal-keepers of logical action 
is, however, still to be seen as limited and thus liable to scholarly analysis. It 
is not possible to engage casual semiotic subjects in the control mechanism 
of semiospherical action: the structure and limits of the semiotic reality are 
watched and maintained by diverse sociocultural institutions ranging from the 
macro (e.g. administrative organizations) to the micro (sign systems). These 
institutions oftentimes possess more or less legitimized articulations as texts that 
are institutions themselves. And inasmuch as those sociocultural institutions are 
managed and upheld by physically existing individuals, we can still discern at 
least the conditional or possible limits of the semiotic reality. In this light views 
on culture and society as conglomerations of texts as they have conceptually been 
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developed in, for example, New Criticism or cultural semiotics, are not merely 
hypothetical or metaphorical, but quite usable in the analysis of the structure 
and functioning of sociocultural open systems. In the sociocultural textual body 
accounts and arguments have settled concerning the logical measure and value of 
action as those accounts have matured in public informational space. And whilst 
the paradoxical tendency of open sociocultural systems becoming more and 
more closed hampers the analysis of the efficacy of action in terms of feedback-
loops between systems and their environments from the viewpoint of the systems 
theory, a semiotic angle seems to offer solutions as permeating the logic of the 
semiotic reality. In this sense it is not possible to agree with Winfried Nöth who 
sees systems theory as a powerful aid to semiotics in “disclosing isomorphisms 
between presemiotic (e.g. physical or biological) and semiotic systems” (Nöth 
1990: 542). Although Nöth put this forward at the beginning of the 1990s, this 
opinion must be opposed not only from the viewpoint of the contemporary age 
of virtual reality. The prevailing non-logical conduct in open social systems as 
functioning largely through self-referential feedback loops draws a very clear 
boundary between presemiotic and sociocultural systems. The lack of univocal 
logic of sociocultural action means that it is exactly the semiotic toolkit that 
ought to be used for analysing the probability of the correctness of that action 
as discussed and reflected in public informational space. The rationality guiding 
social activity depends not that much on the structure of the traditional pyramid 
of needs, because that pyramid can be turned upside down by the management 
of metaneeds, and the key to rationality can only be found in sociocultural texts 
and discourses. Sociocultural rationality is not compatible with the rationality 
associated with, for example, satisfying primary needs, for sociocultural needs 
are not rational in the sense of being objective and objectively measurable as 
following the biological functional circle. It is difficult to agree with Nöth in 
that “both the biological and cybernetic systems only react to their environment 
according to their inner needs, that is their desired state” (Nöth 1990: 544). If 
taking sociocultural systems as cybernetic, it is clear that their inner needs and 
their desired state are culture topics in informational space and therefore non-
logical and oftentimes unconscious by principle and essence.
 All (meaningful) behaviour occurs in a complex of integration and is 
conditioned and finally crystallized in a logico-meaningful-experi(m)ental nexus 
that extends from the level of the Mind and the psychic state to the knowledge 
embedded in social and cultural institutions (and legitimized therein), being 
thereby simultaneously objectivated and objectified. Obviously, when thinking 
more deeply about the levels of integration, they should not be separated, but 
rather taken as facets of processes similar to the various kinds of crystallization 
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discussed above. Meanings get integrated in sociocultural systems (becoming 
eventually crystallized) through conduct in social situations. Thus, understanding 
sociocultural institutions as modelling systems brings together trends which might 
seem far apart at first glance. The common ground for approaches represented by 
Pareto, Parsons, Sorokin, Lévi-Strauss and many other eminent researchers is – in 
the logical end – formed by the (seemingly?) parallel universes of systems theory 
and semiotics. A glance from another perspective suggests comprehending not 
only social or cultural assemblages as institutions, but including sign systems in 
the latter as well. Sign systems are institutions with social and cultural dimensions 
shaping people’s world-view and directing their operating with both the physical 
and the semiotic environment. They are formed, developed and maintained by 
social and cultural and, in the end, sociocultural agents. By bringing together the 
social, cultural and individual, sign systems as institutions point to the proximity 
of semiotics, semiology, and systems theory. This means that the above-mentioned 
authors can be logically linked with argumentation presented by Saussure, Pavlov, 
Piaget, and numerous representatives of the microinteractionist discourse.
 Clearly, such a holistic view on humans, society, culture, and environment has 
also been represented by the very conditional labels for research trends proposed 
by several classics: for example, Saussure and semiology and ‘general (social) 
psychology’, Peirce and ‘logic as semiotics’, Pareto and his ‘general sociology’, 
Morris and ‘unified science’, even Piaget’s ‘genetic epistemology’... As noted before 
by many authors (e.g. Sonesson 2008), such holism concerns a very essential 
unity of sign systems used by the individual in society and by social groups in 
wider social conglomerations. It also creates coherence in the cultural system 
by intersemiotic and intersemiosic connections between the diverse walks of 
culture, it generates such cohesion between cultural and social units that we can 
talk about sociocultural systems. Intersemiotic processes in sociocultural systems 
demand that we abandon inspecting culture and society by separate segments 
(e.g. semiotics of cinema, literature, media, gender, etc.) as fields in a pie chart. 
Unfortunately, the cohesion of sign systems on the object level is in a curious 
discordancy with the metalevel, where we can witness the existence of subdomains 
of semiotics dedicated to minute segments of analysis, to say nothing of taking for 
granted such areas of study as sociosemiotics, cultural semiotics, biosemiotics, 
semioethics, spatial semiotics and so forth. 
Whilst the division of a human into the biological and the cultural being takes 
us way back in history, we should remember: that ‘human’ still remains the very 
same Homo sapiens, and that integral unity should also be kept in mind on the 
metalevel. It is not by the diverse kinds and types of cultural, biological, or societal 
phenomena we should approach man, culture and society, but by the semiotic 
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procedures and processes that take place in the various spheres of activities of 
Homo sapiens. The general metalevel approaches proposed by people, some of 
whom were mentioned above, have exactly the same common presumption if 
interpreted using a semiotic vocabulary: meaning making is a universal process, 
it has universal logical formulas and it is more or less limited in those formulas. 
At the same time semiosis comes around on different levels of development that 
concern ontogenetic individual development and also phylogenetic development 
in the wide sense as described by Walter Koch through his conception of evolu-
tionary cultural semiotics (see esp. Koch 1986: 53–63). Of course, if we study 
human behaviour in the sociocultural and environmental context, we have to 
admit certain semiotic synergy that holds between semiosis at the individual, 
social and cultural levels that also have to rise successfully to environmental 
challenges. This synergy is clearly visible in such concepts as socialization, inter-
nalization, accommodation and the like when used to describe how the individual 
grows into a member of a society and a culture, while learning also adaptation to 
a specific natural environment. We also know about the importance of natural 
language for the development of individual semiotic skills in the web of cultural 
(secondary) modelling systems. Yet as mentioned above, curiously the synergy 
and even the frequent homology not only of sign systems, but the very mechanism 
of semiosis is often forgotten. At the same time, taking into account the very 
complex background of the TMS’s primary and secondary modelling systems as 
linked with the ideas of Pavlov and Malinowski, and binding that set with ideas 
about the ontological development of psychological skills, it is perhaps useful to 
presume the intermingled essence of cognitive and sensory processes, semiotic 
and psychological departments of the Mind. And, adding to that complex topics 
entailed by Sebeok’s proposition of seeing levels of modelling in at least a threefold 
hierarchy, we probably should not rule out that all these issues are not only 
intermingled, but also mixed and even messed up, especially at the contemporary 
stage of civiliographic development.
 One of the most important conclusions we can draw from the above seems 
to be that in sociocultural systems public informational space is shaped and 
manipulated by the creation and arrangement of diverse types of texts and culture 
topics. Interpretation of texts is moulded through interaction and sociocultural 
feedback loops in specifically constructed time and space, as it is also shaped by 
other sociocultural contextual factors. However, even more importantly we should 
pay attention to how hypothetical objective reality, sociocultural and semiotic 
reality, interpretation of texts and other semiotic behaviours are regulated by the 
conditioning of semiotic reflexes and crystallization of (semiotic) institutions. 
The identity and both internal integration and integration of social bodies with 
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external environments is largely driven by interaction. The latter can proceed 
via sign systems that, beginning at the level of natural language, are examples 
of second (and higher) order(s) of modelling. Considering that modelling is a 
societal activity, we can see how interaction crystallizes principles of meaning 
making and realms of reference. It is this conventionality of the socializing 
process that introduces humans to conventional links with diverse environments 
and that points at the at least twice-conditioned essence of referential reality 
and, alongside with contemporary technical and technological advancements, 
drives us to the phenomenon of not only pseudoreferential reality, but, what 
is more, pseudointentional semiotic activity. Yet this should not lead us to 
semiotic desperation, for even if the reality be pseudoreferential and semiosis 
pseudointentional, the semiotic essence of sign systems nevertheless remains the 
same and provides us with objective material of analysis. The replacement of the 
physical environment as the ground for reference by a semiotic environment does 
not change the fact that learning is still environmental and in this sense objectively 
based. There is just a curious nuance added: whilst sign systems imply that 
humans capable of abstracting and generalizing relations with the environment, 
and, for example, replacing signals from the environment with conditioned signs 
in communication, it largely remains unnoticed that the environment itself is not 
that original “objective reality” any more, but a conditioned informational space 
instead. As crystallization binds the numerous levels and fields of the semiotic 
reality together, it can be seen as the key to modelling activity, for it is the very 
source of stability and inertia of sign systems as institutions and (e.g. social, 
formal, administrative) institutions as sign systems. This means that it is probably 
no longer even the actual behaviour that we ought to see as our research object, 
but the structure, dynamism, and potential contents of flows of information in the 
space of the conditioned reference of semiotic reality.2
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От систематического семиотического моделирования до 
псевдоинтенциональной референции
Общества как открытые социальные системы действуют через семиотические системы 
моделирования. Мы рассматриваем их роль в формировании (обусловливании) 
первичных и вторичных потребностей, а также метапотребностей, обусловленных 
социальными системами. Проводимое посредством социализации обусловливание 
позволяет натурализировать семиотическую реаль ность до уровня, где мы сможем 
говорить не только о неосознананном, но также и о неинтенциональной семиозисной 
деятельности. Тем самым сфера индексальности будет подвергнута сомнению. Если 
индексальность соединена с неинтенциональной референцией, то неинтенциональный 
семиозис означает размывание и слияние разных реальностей гораздо дальше границ 
семиотических пространств, называемых симулякрами. Особенно остро это ощущается 
в контексте новых технологий, где смешиваются физическая, семиотическая и чисто 
виртуальная реальности, что при водит к появлению семиотической инсуляризации. 
При этом становится трудно опре делить объект исследования, поскольку сам субъект 
рассеивается: реальное и виртуальное смешиваются также с точки зрения их обитателей 
(биологические люди, пользователи компьютера, аватары, виртуальные личности). 
Таким обра зом, прагматическое измерение семиотики постепенно теряется. Кроме 
того, рефе рен циальная действительность удаляется от информационного пространства, 
создан ного и представленного в «традиционных» дискурсах, основываясь все более на 
псевдоинтенциональном семиозисе.
Süstemaatilisest semiootilisest modelleerimisest 
pseudointentsionaalse viitelisuseni
Ühiskonnad kui avatud sotsiaalsed süsteemid toimivad semiootiliste modelleerimissüsteemide 
kaudu. Vaatleme viimaste rolli primaar-, sekundaar- ja metavajaduste kujundamisel (tingi-
misel) sotsiaalsetes süsteemides. Sotsialiseerimise kaudu sooritatav tingimine võimaldab 
semiootilist reaalsust loomulikustada selle määrani, kus me ei räägi ainult mitteteadvustatud, 
vaid ka mitteintentsionaalsest märgiloomelisest tegevusest. Seekaudu muutub kogu indek-
siaalsusvaldkond küsitavaks. Kui indeksiaalsus on seotud mitteintentsionaalse viitelisusega, 
siis tähendab mitteintentsionaalne märgiloome eri reaalsuste ähmastumist ja segunemist 
68 Anti Randviir
hoopis kaugemale nende semiootiliste ruumide piiridest, mida nimetatakse simulaakrumideks. 
See on eriti päevakohane uute tehnoloogiliste võimaluste puhul, kus füüsiline, semiootiline 
ja puhtvirtuaalne reaalsus segunevad. Seda küllaltki uut nähtust iseloomustab semiootiline 
saarestumine. Sellega kaasuvalt on veidramgi, et uurimisobjekti on raske määratleda, sest juba 
subjektki hakkab hägustuma: reaalne ja virtuaalne segunevad ka oma asunike (bioloogiline 
inimene, arvutikasutaja, avatar, virtuaalne identiteet) osas. Nii hakkab semiootika pragmaatiline 
mõõde kaotsi minema. Ka viitereaalsus liigub eemale sellest inforuumist, mida loodi ja kajastati 
“traditsioonilistes” diskursuse vooludes, ja põhineb pigem pseudoviitelisel tähendusloomel. 
